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While research has extensively documented the inter- and intra-personal consequences of
perspective taking, less is known about the mechanisms that underlie this process.
Recent research has explored self-other overlap as a mediator of perspective taking on
various pro-social outcomes, such as helping and decreased stereotyping. Results have
been mixed, perhaps due to the use of different methodologies and scales that actually
measure different facets of self-other overlap. This dissertation investigates the structure
of self-other overlap and examines how perspective taking may affect only certain facets
of self-other overlap, as well as the direction in which this overlap occurs. To test the
conceptual equivalence of different overlap measures, in Study 1, participants completed
several previously used measures of overlap for two targets: their best friend and an
acquaintance. Factor analyses revealed two distinct factors of self-other overlap -
perceived closeness and attribute overlap - although small variations emerged depending
von target. These two factors had unique associations with several relationship quality and
individual difference measures. Study 2 extended these results by manipulating
perspective taking with a stranger. Results replicated the same factor structure from
Study 1, and found that perspective taking had different effects on the two factors. Study
3 examined whether or not perspective taking affected the direction of self-other overlap
by changing one's attitudes and beliefs to become more like the other person. Results
supported a model in which perceived closeness predicted belief change toward the target
person, even after accounting for other related consequences of perspective taking such
as empathy and positive attitudes. Together, these results suggest that self-other overlap
is a multi-dimensional construct associated with different psychological responses.
These results are discussed in connection with the relationship between self-other overlap
and perspective taking and how this may lead to "self-expansion."
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CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Sayings such as The Golden Rule, "walking in another man's moccasins... ", and
"how would you feel in that situation?" all belie an underlying psychological reality -
taking the perspective of another person often leads to more positive and pro-social
interactions with that person. For the past 50 years, research has provided an extensive
list of the intrapersonal and interpersonal outcomes that are associated with perspective
taking. Within the domain of intrapersonal outcomes, perspective taking has been
associated with both cognitive and affective changes within the perceiver. For example,
a consistent cognitive intrapersonal outcome of perspective taking is that the perceiver is
more likely to use situational attributions to describe that person's behavior (Archer,
Foushee, Davis, & Aderman, 1979; Betancourt, 1990; Galper, 1976; Regan & Toten,
1975; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003; Wegner & Finstuen, 1977). Furthermore,
perspective taking has been associated with more liking toward the target person
(Aderman, Brehm, & Katz, 1974; Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson,
1997; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996), more positive attitudes toward the target
person and his or her out-group (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Batson,
Polycarpou, Harmon-Jones, Imhoff, Mitchener, Bednar, Klein, & Highberger, 1997;
2Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and a decreased use of stereotypical judgments (Galinsky
& Moskowitz, 2000).
Among the affective changes related to perspective taking, perhaps the most
documented outcome is that perspective taking leads to feelings of empathic concern.
Batson and colleagues (e.g., Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Toi & Batson, 1982) have
defined empathic concern as an "other-oriented" feeling toward another person's welfare
that encompasses such emotions as feeling sympathetic, moved, compassionate, and
tender (Batson et aI., 1997). Most notably, Batson and colleagues have provided an
extensive body of work demonstrating that perspective taking - via increased feelings of
empathic concern - is also reliably associated with the interpersonal outcome of helping
the target person (see Batson 1987; 1991 for a review).
While much research has documented the intrapersonal and interpersonal
outcomes of perspective taking, comparable less research has examined the underlying
the mechanisms that explain how perspective taking occurs and why it leads to these pro-
social outcomes. In reality, trying to take the perspective of another person's point of
view is a diabolically difficult task, in large part because one never has direct access to
the contents of another person's mind. One cannot "peer" into a friend's head and
understand all of his thoughts and feelings. A friend's mind - like the mind of every
other person in this world - is simply not available for direct "download" (a modern
metaphor for the ancient "other minds" problem). Invariably, other social-cognitive
processes must be employed during perspective taking to compensate for this
3discrepancy. In the past 10 years, one possible mediator of perspective taking that has
been examined is the construct of "self-other overlap."
Goals of this Dissertation
The three studies described in this dissertation were designed to systematically
examine the relationship between perspective taking and self-other overlap. There were
three general goals of this dissertation: First, I sought to clarify the meaning of the term
"self-other overlap" by examining whether or not measures used in past research were
actually tapping the same construct (Study 1 and 2). Second, I sought to examine which
aspects of self-other overlap were enhanced when a person attempts to take the
perspective of a target person (Study 2). Finally, I sought to clarify in Study 3 whether or
not perspective taking increased self-other overlap in a particular direction. In other
words, if perspective taking does lead to greater self-other overlap, is this due to
perceptions of the other becoming more like the self (i.e., through projection), or by
perceptions of the self-concept becoming more "other-like" (i.e., self-expansion)?
Historical Background of Self-Other Overlap
Many of the ideas and much of the theory on self-other overlap in perspective-
taking research have been adapted from the extensive work of Aron and his colleagues in
the close relationship literature (Aron, & Aron, 1986; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992;
Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Mashek, Aron, & Boncimino, 2003). They have
discussed self-other overlap as "lessened self/other distinction" and the inclusion of
resources, perspectives, and characteristics of others into the self (Aron et aI., 1991).
Aron and colleagues have suggested that the process of entering and maintaining an
4intimate relationship with another person contributes to a lessened self-other distinction
at the cognitive level and influences how information is processed about the
development, maintenance, and dissolution of the relationship (Aron et ai., 1991). Using
a reaction-time task, they found that participants were significantly slower at making
"me/not me" judgments for traits on which they differed with their spouse versus those
traits that they said they shared with him or her. They also found that participants were
significantly worse at recalling the names of objects that they had previously formed
mental images of themselves or a close other (such as their mother) interacting with,
relative to objects that had been paired with a non-close other; there was no difference in
performance between objects paired with the self versus those paired with the close other
(Aron et ai., 1991; Study 2). These researchers interpreted both of these findings as
evidence of greater self-other overlap.
However, the most common method for measuring self-other overlap is to use the
Inclusion of Other into Self (lOS) scale (Aron et ai., 1992). The lOS contains 7 pairs of
circle that vary in the extent that they overlap with each other, from no overlap to nearly-
complete overlap. One circle represents the "self," while the second circle represents the
"other" person in the interaction or relationship. Pairs of circles that overlap to a greater
extent indicate perceptions of increased self-other overlap by the participant. In order to
clarify the aspects of self-other overlap and how they related to the lOS, Aron et al.
(1992) conducted a factor analysis of the lOS and several other self-report measures of
closeness. These results indicated that there were two types of closeness - a behavioral
component of closeness that included the amount of time and diversity of activities spent
5with the other person (behaving close) and an affective response of greater intimacy and
closeness (feeling close).
In the perspective-taking literature, Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini, Brown,
Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007) have described self-other
overlap as a sense of oneness and "shared or interconnected identities with others"
(Cialdini et aI., 1997; p. 483). Connecting their definition with Aron's, Cialdini et aI.
(1997) measured self-other overlap using the lOS. They have also measured their
definition of self-other overlap by asking participants to rate the extent that they would
use the word "we" to describe their relationship with the other person and to rate their
perceived similarity with that person (Goldberg & Cialdini, 2007). In contrast, Davis et
al. (1996) have defined self-other overlap more narrowly as a cognitive phenomenon in
which mental constructs representing the self and others become increasingly
overlapping. In Davis et aI.'s study, self-other overlap was measured as the percentage of
adjectives from a 149-trait checklist that participants selected to describe both themselves
and another person they observed on video.
Finally, Batson and colleagues (1997) have interpreted previous discussion of
"self-other overlap" as psychological indistinguishability, suggesting that previous
researchers were describing a process in which people actually confused themselves with
others. According to this view of self-other overlap, people begin to see themselves and
the other person as "one" and find it increasingly difficult to distinguish how they are
different from the other person (Batson, 1997). Batson et aI.' s (1997) interpretation of
self-other overlap was created a contrast to other researchers, such as Cialdini et al
6(1997), who have hypothesized that feelings of oneness mediate the relationship between
empathy and helping. This is a stronger claim than the definition offered by Cialdini and
his colleagues, who do not believe that self-other overlap leads to a person to believe that
the self and the other person are actually the same (Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce,
Sagarin, & Lewis, 1997).
Is Self-Other Overlap a Consequence of Perspective Taking?
To date, there continues to be disagreement over whether or not perspective
taking leads to greater self-other overlap, and in particular, whether or not self-other
overlap mediates the effect of perspective taking on many of the pro-social outcomes
cited previously. In support of this relationship, Davis et aI. (1996) and Galinsky and
Moskowitz (2000) have found that participants instructed to take the perspective of a
target person shared a greater percentage of personality traits with that person, relative to
participants in a control condition (although, in Davis et aI., 1996, this was only true for
positive traits). Furthermore, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) found that self-other
overlap mediated the relationship between perspective taking and more positive
evaluations of the target person and less stereotypical judgments of that person's group.
Similarly, Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini et aI., 1997; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007;
Neuberg et aI. 1997) have found that feelings of "oneness" are enhanced during
perspective taking, and that this form of self-other overlap at least partially mediates the
relationship between empathy and helping
7In spite of this evidence, others have found evidence suggesting that self-other
overlap is not a consequence of perspective taking. Notably, as part of his empathy-
altruism model of helping, Batson (1987, 1991) has hypothesized that empathic concern
(and perspective taking by proxy, since he uses perspective taking to evoke feelings of
empathic concern) leads to self-other distinctiveness rather than self-other overlap. For
Batson and his colleagues (1997), the fundamental difference between altruism and
egoism is whether the underlying motivation is to help the other or oneself. Self-other
distinctiveness as a component of empathy is critical because it suggests that the
motivation behind empathy can be attributed to the genuine concern for the other person
(i.e., altruism) and not an egoistical desire. However, if the "self' and "other" cannot be
distinguished in empathy, then this difference between altruism and egoism disappears.
In other words, "if the empathy-helping relationship is due to self-other overlap, then the
empathy-altruism hypothesis is not correct; it is not even meaningful" (Batson et aI.,
1997; p. 497). Consistent with this belief, Batson et al. (1997) found that perspective
taking did not lead to greater self-other overlap nor did their measures of self-other
overlap mediate the effect of perspective taking and empathy on helping.
Research in neuroscience also suggests that perspective taking may lead to greater
self-other distinction. Several studies have found that taking the perspective of another
person leads to an increased activation of areas in the parietal cortex (Decety &
Sommerville, 2003; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Ruby & Decety, 2004). This area
of the brain is associated with self-agency, or a sense that actions of the self are separate
from one's surrounding environment. These researchers have interpreted increased
8activation in this area of the brain as evidence that perceptions of the self actually become
more separate and distinct from the other person during perspective taking, rather than
leading to greater perceived overlap with the other person.
Thus, the extent that self-other overlap and perspective taking are related to each
other continues to be an unresolved issue in the literature. Empirical evidence examining
self-other overlap as a consequence and possible mediator of perspective taking has both
supported this theoretical link (Cialdini et aI., 1997; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2008; Maner,
Luce, Neuberg, & Cialdini, 2002; Neuberg et aI., 1997) as well as failed to find such a
connection (Batson et aI., 1997; Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005).
Self-Other Overlap: A Multi-Faceted Construct
Although researchers have used a variety of terms to describe the process of self-
other overlap that they hypothesize occurs due to perspective taking (such as
"overlapping representations", "oneness," and "psychological indistiguishability," just to
name a few), the general assumption has been they have all been talking about the same
concept. Equally important, these researchers have also assumed that the measures they
have used to assess self-other overlap all tap the same construct. However, very little
research has actually examined whether or not this is true. In fact, I assert that this has
been an erroneous assumption and that these measures of self-other overlap assess
different facets of self-other overlap. A main goal of this dissertation is to provide
evidence that past research has found contradictory evidence regarding the association
between perspective taking and self-other overlap because only certain facets of self-
other overlap are affected by perspective taking.
9There is already some evidence suggesting that self-other overlap is a multi-
faceted construct. First, as mentioned previously, Aron et aI. (1991) found evidence
indicating that closeness (a theoretically similar construct to self-other overlap) consisted
of two factors that they called behaving close and perceived closeness. Second, in the
Batson et aI. (1997) study, the researchers included three measures of self-other overlap:
1) perceived similarity with the target person, 2) the lOS, and 3) a measure that involved
the mean absolute difference in ratings of the self and the target person on several
personality attributes. However, the correlations among these three measures were quite
low (ranging from -.03 to .20), which left the authors themselves wondering whether or
not they were measuring self-other overlap and what would be the best way to assess this
construct (Batson et aI., 1997). Study 1 was designed to answer this question.
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CHAPTER II
STUDY 1: THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-OTHER OVERLAP MEASURES
Introduction
The primary purpose of Study 1 was to examine whether or not several measures
of self-other overlap used in the perspective-taking literature actually assessed the same
underlying construct. Thus, I restricted inclusion of self-other overlap measures in this
study to those that had been used in published perspective-taking studies in the past-
with one exception described below. Many of these researchers studying perspective-
taking have relied on Aron's concept of self-other overlap when creating their own novel
measure of self-overlap. In order to examine the conceptual equivalence of these
measures of self-other overlap with the concept of self-other overlap that has been
discussed in the close relationship literatures, I also included a measure of closeness that
Aron et al. (1992) used in their original validity study of the lOS - the Relationship
Closeness Index (RCI; Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989). Although not an exhaustive
list of all measures of self-other overlap, Study 1 provided a substantive step in
determining if several of the more well-known measures of self-other overlap (many of
which have been used in multiple published studies) are actually related to each other, as
has been implied in the perspective-taking literature.
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Unlike previous studies, participants in Study 1 completed all of these measure of
self-other overlap for a particular target person, in this case, someone for whom self-other
overlap should be high (a best friend) and someone for whom self-other overlap should
be lower (an acquaintance). Based on the review of the literature, I hypothesized that
these measures of self-other overlap would not all assess the same construct.
Hypotheses and Rationale
Hypothesis 1: Past Measures ofSel.fother Overlap Tap Several Different Factors.
I predicted that the data would not support a single factor of self-other overlap.
Rather, based on prior research, I predicted that at least two different factors of self-other
overlap would emerge. Evidence has indicated that the lOS, "we"-ness measure, and
perceived similarity are positively correlated with each other (Cialdini et aI., 1997) and
that the lOS is correlated with most of the subscales of the RCI (Aron et aI., 1992), so I
predicted that these items should load on one factor. Batson et aI's (1997) measure of a
difference score between ratings of attributes for self and attributes of another was
intended to be theoretically similar to Davis et aI.' s (1996) adjective overlap based on a
personality checklist, so I predicted that these items would load on a different factor.
Hypothesis 2: These Factors ofSel.fOther Overlap Would Be Associated With Unique
Interpersonal Outcomes and Individual-Difference Measures Related to Perspective
Taking.
Assuming that several factors of self-other overlap were identified, I further
predicted that these factors would be conceptually significant (i.e. not simply due to
method variance). Thus, the second goal of Study 1 was to examine the convergent and
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discriminant validity of these different factors by correlating them with several indicators
of relationship quality and individual-difference measures related to perspective taking.
Self-other overlap has been associated with several markers of a close and satisfying
relationship (Aron et aI., 1992; Aron & Fraley, 1999). I was curious to know whether or
not all factors of self-other overlap were associated with better relationship quality. To
examine this question, participants completed several questions assessing their
impressions of the other person and the quality of their relationship with that person.
Of course, the main focus of this dissertation is examining the possible
relationship between self-other overlap and perspective taking. As a first step in
answering this question, I also was interested in correlating any self-other overlap factors
that emerged with self-reported individual differences in perspective taking and empathy
by giving participants the subscales of the Davis (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI) that measured these two constructs, as well giving them several other individual
difference measures related to perspective taking and empathy, such as an altruism
measure (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981), the Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001; Carol & Yung, 2006), a measure of
adult attachment style (Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996), and a measure of self-
consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Rushton et aI.'s (1981) scale of
altruism measures the frequency that participants engage in a variety of pro-social
activities and has been shown to be associated with other measures of empathy, prosocial
values, and other forms of altruism. The Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001)
quantifies the extent that a person exhibits "autistic traits" and taps areas of social skills,
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attention switching, attention to detail, communication, and imagination, and was
designed to be sensitive to differences in these traits even among individuals not
diagnosed with autism or related disorders. The adult attachment scale (Simpson et aI.,
1996) measures how participants relate to their romantic partner on two general
dimensions: 1) the degree that they hold negative views of others, which motivates them
to avoid closeness and intimacy, and 2) the degree to which they hold negative self-views
in the context of their relationships, which leads them to be preoccupied with issues of
abandonment. Finally, Fenigstein et aI.'s (1975) self-consciousness scale measures the
extent that participants habitually engage in self-awareness in two domains - private
aspects of the self and publicly displayed self-aspects. Additionally, this scale measures
the extent that participants feel anxious about being in public and being evaluated by
others.
A final and more exploratory goal of Study 1 was to examine whether or not
measures of self-other overlap are interpreted differently by participants for different
targets - i.e., close others vs. strangers. Some researchers suggested that self-other
overlap with a stranger is fundamentally the same as self-other overlap with a close
other- albeit, to a much lesser degree, similar to the beginning of a nascent relationship
(Davis et aI., 1996, Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005). In contrast, others have argued that
people interpret the idea of "self-other overlap" differently in the context of a relative
stranger than with their best friend or romantic partner, claiming that these measures of
self-other overlap for a stranger simply assess feelings of felt care (Batson et aI., 1997).
If true, this issue becomes particularly problematic when researchers studying perspective
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taking with non-close others include measures of self-other overlap taken from the close
relationship literature and assume that they are measuring the same construct in both
contexts. In Study 1, participants completed measures of overlap for a target with whom
self-other overlap should be high - their best friend. By having participants also
complete the self-other overlap measures for a casual acquaintance, I hoped to provide an
initial answer to the question about whether or not these measures are interpreted
differently for a person who is not close to self.
Method
Participants
Participants were 132 undergraduates (73% female) who participated in exchange
for course credit. Demographic information was provided by 130 of the participants. Of
these participants, 106 identified themselves as Caucasian, 10 as Asian, 3 as African
American, 1 as American Indian, 1 as Latino/Latina, and 9 as some other ethnic group.
The mean age was 19.80 years (SDage = 2.30, age range from 18 to 33). Five participants
reported that English was not their primary language; they reported speaking English for
between 4 and 13 years.
Materials
Measures ofSelf-Other Overlap.
Participants completed a series of measures to assess self-other overlap between
the self and their best fi"iend, and between the self and an acquaintance. All but one of
these measures of self-other overlap had been used in previous studies and included the
following:
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Adjective checklist overlap. Adapted from Davis et al. (1996), participants
completed a personality adjective checklist for themselves, and then several days later
completed the same checklist for the target person (best friend and acquaintance). The
condensed adjective checklist contained 114 personality traits (41 positive, 35 negative,
and 38 neutral( Replicating Davis et al.'s methodology, self-other overlap was
calculated as the percentage of traits selected for selfthat were later used to describe the
target person, computed separately for adjectives of each of three valences (positive,
negative, and neutral).
Absolute difference ofattributes. Participants also rated themselves on 16
attributes that were taken from the Batson et al. (1997) study, and then later in the study
they rated the target person on these same attributes. Participants rated the attributes on a
9-point scale from 1 ("not at all") to 9 ("extremely"). These 16 attributes were friendly,
intelligent, spontaneous, honest, open, cooperative, shy, polite, responsible, brave,
pressured, appreciative, lonely, overburdened, carefree, andfearful. 2 Overlap was
originally calculated as the mean absolute difference in ratings of these attributes for the
self minus the ratings for the target person. However, to maintain consistency with the
1 Past research (Myers & Hodges, 2006) has found that using this reduced adjective checklist findings
replicates the results reported by Davis et al. (1996).
2 Originally, Batson et al. (1997) selected these 16 attributes because they considered half of them relevant
for the specific target person in their study. Consequently, they created two overlap scores for the relevant
and irrelevant attributes. However, this approach did not make sense for the current study, because
participants selected their own target people who could have a variety of different characteristics. Thus,
one overall difference score was calculated across all16 of the attributes used in the Batson et al. (1997)
study.
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other measures of self-other overlap, this measure was re-scored such that higher a larger
value indicated greater self-other overlap with the target person.
Inclusion ofothers in self (lOS) scale. The lOS (Aron et aI., 1992) contains 7
pairs of circles that vary in the extent that they overlap with each other. Participants were
instructed to indicate which pair of circles best described their relationship with the target
person (best friend or acquaintance). Higher scores, which corresponded to pairs of
circles that increasingly overlapped, represented greater self-other overlap.
Dynamic lOS. This computerized version of the lOS created in our lab showed
participants two circles (both 24 mm in diameter) displayed 3 cm apart on a computer
screen, with the circles representing the self and the other person. Participants were then
instructed to use two 'joysticks" to independently move the circle representing the self
and the circle representing the target person (i.e., best friend or acquaintance) until the
location of the two circles best described their relationship with that person. Distance
was measured in pixels (higher numbers indicate greater distance and thus less overlap).
The circle representing the participant was labeled "S" for self, while the other circle was
labeled "0" for other, representing either the participant's best friend or acquaintance. I
counterbalanced which circle ("S" or "0") appeared on the left side of the screen and
which appeared on the right. Again, this measure was re-scored such that a higher value
indicated greater self-other overlap.
The dynamic lOS differed from the original lOS is three key ways: 1) the
dynamic lOS measured the amount of overlap between self and other on a continuous
scale rather than providing just seven discreet options for participants to choose, 2) the
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dynamic lOS allowed participants to move the circles closer or farther apart from where
they originally appeared on the screen, allowing them to report less self-other overlap,
and 3) the dynamic lOS allowed participants to move the circle representing the self and
the circle representing the other separately.
"We "-ness. Following Cialdini et al. (1997), I asked participants to rate the
extent that they would use the tenn "we" to characterize themselves and the target
person. Participants responded to this question on a 7-point scale from 1 ("not at all") to 7
("extremely").
Perceived similarity. Following Batson et al. (1997) and Goldstein and Cialdini
(2007), I asked participants to rate the degree of their perceived similarity with the target
person on a 9-point scale from 1 ("not at all") to 9 ("extremely").
Relationship closeness index (ReI). The RCI (Berscheid et aI., 1989) is a self-
report questionnaire that measures three aspects of closeness: amount of time spent
together (frequency), variety of interactions engaged in with the target (diversity), and
degree of perceived influence of the target on one's decision, activities, and plans
(strength). The frequency subscale asked participants to estimate the number ofhours
they spent with the target (best friend or acquaintance) over the past week. The diversity
subscale is a checklist of 38 possible activities done alone with the target during the past
week. Sample activities involve doing laundry, going to a clothing store, and preparing a
meal. The strength subscale included 34 Likert-scale items about the target's influence
on one's life. Sample items include "this person will influence my future financial
security" and "this person influences important things in my life."
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Individual Difference Measures
As part of Study 1, participants also completed several individual difference
measures. They included the following:
Interpersonal reactivity index (IRI). General tendencies to experience empathic
concern and to engage in perspective taking were measured using the 1RI (Davis, 1983).
Both subscales contain 7 statements and participants are asked to rate how well the
statements describe them on a 5-point scale from 1 ("does not describe me very well") to
5 ("describes me very well"). Sample items for each subscale include: "I often have
tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than I am" (empathic concern) and "I
try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision" (perspective
taking).
Self-report altruism scale (SRA). The SRA (Rushton, et aI., 1981) asks
participants to rate the frequency that they engage in 20 pro-social activities from 1
("never") to 4 ("very often"). A sample item is "I have offered to help a handicapped or
elderly stranger across the street." The average response to these items was calculated
for each participant.
Autism quotient scale (AQ). The AQ (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001) is a 50-item
questionnaire that measures how much a person exhibits "autistic-like traits."
Participants rated the extent that they agree with these statements on a 4-point scale:
"definitely disagree", "slightly disagree", "slightly agree", and "definitely agree". All
items were scored such that agreement indicated greater autistic tendencies. A sample
item is "I frequently find that I don't know how to keep a conversation going." Scores
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were calculated as the number of statements a participant rated as "slightly agree" or
"definitely agree".
Adult attachment questionnaire (AAQ). The AAQ (Simpson et aI., 1996)
measures attachment along the two dimensions of avoidance (i.e., negative view of the
relationship) and ambivalence (negative self-views regarding the relationship).
Participants rated 17 statements on a 7-point scale from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 7
("strongly agree"), with higher ratings indicating a less secure - and more problematic for
the relationship - attachment style. A sample item from the avoidance subscale is "I
don't like people getting too close to me" and an item from the ambivalence subscale is
"Others often are reluctant to get as close as I would like." The average response to these
items was calculated for each participant.
Se(f-consciousness scale (SCS). The SCS (Fenigstein et aI., 1975) contains
subscales for public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and social anxiety.
Participants rated their agreement on 27 statements on a 9-point scale from 0 ("not at
all") to 8 ("very much") with higher ratings indicating greater endorsement for each of
these three dimensions. For each subscale, the sum of response ratings was calculated for
each participant. Sample items from each subscale include: "I am concerned about my
style of doing things" (public self-consciousness), "I reflect about myself a lot" (private
self-consciousness), and "It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations"
(social anxiety).
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Procedure
Several days before the main part of the study, participants completed Davis et
al.'s (1996) adjective checklist for themselves either as part ofa general survey packet
administered to subject pool participants at the beginning of the term or as a separate
"Part 1" of the current study that occurred at least 7 days before participants returned to
the lab3. Upon entering the lab to complete the main study, participants first completed
the individual difference measures on the computer in front of them. Also at this time,
participants rated themselves on the 16 attributes taken from the Batson et al. (1997)
study.
After participants completed the individual difference measures and the 16
attributes for themselves on the computer, the experimenter handed them a packet to
complete. In this packet participants completed the various measures of self-other overlap
for both their best friend and an acquaintance. "Acquaintance" was defined in the packet
as someone whom the participant would recognize but did not know very well, such as a
friend of a friend. One section of the packet contained all of the various measures of self-
other overlap for their best friend, while the other section contained the same items for
the acquaintance. The order in which these two sections appeared was counter-balanced
across participants.
3 26 participants completed the adjective checklist as a "part I" of the current study. Analyses found no
significant differences on this measure of self-other overlap between these participants and the majority
who completed the adjective checklist for the self in the general survey.
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Within both sections of the packet, participants first completed the ReI and then
they completed the following additional items about the quality of their relationship with
the target that they rated on a 9-point Likert scale (1 "not at all" to 9 "extremely"): 1) the
extent that they cared about the target, 2) how much they liked the target, and 3) how
much time they wanted to spend with the target. Participants then completed the
remaining self-other overlap measures (i.e., the adjective checklist for the target, the 16
Batson attributes for the target, the lOS, the "we"-ness item, and perceived similarity).
The order that these five measures appeared within this section of the packet was
randomized across participants.
After completing the section of the packet for one target (best friend or
acquaintance), participants completed the dynamic lOS for that same target on the
computer. After an opportunity to practice using the joysticks to adjust the circles
representing the self and target, participants were instructed to move the two circles to
represent their relationship with the target. Whether the circle representing the self
appeared on the right or left side of the computer screen was randomized for all
participants. After completing the dynamic lOS the first time, participants then returned
to the second section of their packet and completed the self-other overlap measures for
the other target. Participants then finished by responding to the dynamic lOS about their
relationship with this target.
After completing the packet and dynamic lOS, some participants then completed
one additional measure of self-other overlap used previously by Aron et al. (1991; Study
2), but not considered central to the research goals of this study. Replicating the
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methodology from Aron et al. (1991) study, participants saw 60 concrete nouns (e.g.,
"toaster") on the computer screen that were randomly paired with one of three people -
themselves, their best friend, or their acquaintance. While this pair appeared on the
screen for 10 seconds, participants were instructed that they should create as "vivid and
interesting a mental image as possible" of the person interacting with the concrete noun.
Participants then wrote down their image on the space provided for each pair during the
20 seconds that the screen was blank before the next concrete noun-person pair appeared.
After the last noun-person pair, the experimenter returned to the cubicle and took the
participant's answer sheet and then administered a surprise memory task by instructing
participants writing down as many of the concrete nouns that saw on the screen in 5
minutes.
However, given the time constraint of the current study and the length of Aron et
al.'s (1992) methodology (35 minutes in total), not all of the participants were able view
all 60 concrete nouns before the study ended. In order to collect their data from this task,
the experimenter ended the program for these participants 5 minutes before the study was
scheduled to end and administered the surprise memory task at that time.
Results
Predictive Validity afSelf-Other Overlap Measures
If all of our measures actually indicate self-other overlap with another person,
scores on all of them should significantly differ between acquaintance and best friend.
To test this, I ran a series of paired-samples t-tests for each measure. Scores on all of the
self-other overlap measures were significantly different between best friend and
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acquaintance and in the hypothesized direction, except for the memory recall task.4
Table 1 provides the means and descriptive statistics for all the self-other overlap
measures by target.
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of self-other overlap measures by target.
Best Friend Acquaintance
Measures MN SD MN SD
lOS 5.01 1.60 1.54 .81
Dynamic lOS (pixels)* 891.7 702.2 2207.5 1676.3
"We"-ness 5.48 1.37 1.89 1.07
Perceived Similarity 6.49 1.61 4.09 1.90
RCI:Strength 105.2 24.0 48.2 17.0
RCI:Diversity 8.48 7.15 1.82 2:61
RCI:Frequency 297.3 341.1 55.2 112.9
Adjective Overlap, Neg Traits 30.5 30.4 22.3 27.1
Adjective Overlap, Neu Traits 38.2 24.4 24.9 21.2
Adjective Overlap, Pas Traits 63.4 21.2 47.6 24.3
Abs Diff of Attributes* 1.72 .62 1.88 .63
Percent Nouns Recalled for Target 43.0 20.0 44.6 19.8
* Original values 'before re-scoring. Low number indicate GREATER self-other overlap
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with the percentage of nouns
accurately recalled for each target (self, best friend, and acquaintance) as the within-
subjects factor. Analyses indicated a significant effect of target on recall, Pillai' s V =
.09, F(2,115) = 5.54,p < .05. Follow-up contrast indicated that participants recalled a
significantly larger percentage of word paired with their acquaintance (MN= 44.6%)
compared to those words paired with their best friend (MN = 42.9%) or the self (MN =
4 Analyses exploring possible gender effects found no significant differences in how men and women rated
their overlap with their best friend and acquaintance, nor in their factor scores based on the factor analysis
ofthese measures. Consequently, gender will not be discussed further.
24
36.3%), F(1, 116) = 8.42,p < .01. However, in contrast to the Aron et al. (1991; Study 2)
results, the difference between recall for best friend and the self in this study was also
significant, F(1, 116) = 6.66, p < .05. The current study also failed to find that the
difference between recall for the non-close person and close other was positively
correlated with any of the other measures of self-other overlap. In sum, there was no
evidence in this study that this memory recall task was a reliable measure of self-other
overlap. Consequently, I decided to exclude this measure from the final set of factor
analyses described below.
To examine the relationship among the various measures of self-other overlap, a
principal components factor analysis using an oblique rotation (direct oblimin) was
conducted on the 11 measures of self-other overlap.5 The first set of analyses examined
the factor structure of the measures for the best friend. The second factor analysis
examined whether or not the factor structure of self-other overlap measures for the
acquaintance was similar to the structure for the best friend.
Factor Analysis ofBest Friend
The correlation matrix of the 11 items of self-other overlap completed for the
participant's best friend is provided in Table 2.6 Examination of the scree plot from an
exploratory factor analysis of self-other overlap measures for the best friend indicated
5 A computer error resulted in the data from the Dynamic lOS being lost for 9 participants. Given that most
participants with any missing data were missing it for one measure of self-other overlap, pair-wise deletion
was used for the factor analysis. Estimation of missing data using maximum likelihood was used in the
structural equation modeling.
6 Analysis of descriptive statistics indicated that RCl:Frequency and dynamic lOS were positively skewed.
As recommended by Berscheid et al. (1989), a log+1 transformation was computed on the RCI :Frequency
scores, while a natural log transformation corrected for skew of the dynamic lOS data.
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that a three-factor model was the most parsimonious (the eigenvalues of the 11 principal
components were 3.04,1.74,1.36,1.05, .99, .71, .61, .56, .45, .31, and .19). The first
three factors accounted for 27.6%,15.8%, and 12.3% of the variance, respectively.
Consequently, I examined the fit of this three-factor solution to the data using structural
equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation. Since maximum likelihood
estimation can lead to convergence problems when the indicators have very different
variances, standardized scores of the self-other overlap measures were used in this
analysis. Fit indices indicated a relatively good fit of the model: X2 (42, n = 142) = 64.8,
p = .01, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .062 (90% CI .029-.09), SRMR = .063. Also, the model
modification indices did not indicate that additional paths should be added from any
indicator to another latent factor, although the residual variance for adjective overlap of
negative traits had to be set at zero. The structure of this three-factor model is found in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Three-factor structure of self-other overlap measures for best friend.
Table 2. Correlation matrix of self-other overlap measures for best friend.
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l.IOS
2. Dynamic lOS .56**
3. "We"-ness .56 .34**
4. Perceived Similarity .36** .26** .19*
5. RCI:Strength .45** .33** .19** .19*
6. RCI:Diversity .33** .19* .44** .075 .38**
7. RCI:Frequency .32** .076 .26** .14 .23** .75**
8. Adjective Overlap, Neg Traits -.79 -.095 -.087 .002 -.018 .050 -.016
9. Adjective Overlap, Neu Traits .11 .067 .020 .11 .041 .13 036 .36**
10. Adjective Overlap, Pos Traits .11 .069 .016 .059 -.10 .062 .16 .019 .40**
11. Abs Diff of Attributes -.17* -.076 -.061 .21 * -.12 -.022 -.037 .11 .23** .17
* p < .05
**p<.OI
N
0\
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Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the lOS, "we"-ness, perceived similarity, the RCI
subscale of strength, and the dynamic lOS exclusively loaded on this first factor, while
the RCI:Diversity and RCI:Frequency subscales loaded on the third factor. However, as
Figure I indicates, factors Iand 3 were positively cOlTelated with each other. The first
and third factors closely replicate the two-factors of closeness found in the Aron et al.
(1992) study. Specifically, Aron et al. (1992) also found that the RCI:Diversity and
RCI:Frequency subscales loaded on a separate factor that they labeled behaving close,
and that this factor was correlated with the other factor of closeness. Consequently, I also
decided to call the third rotated factor behaving close. Aron et al. (1992) had called the
other factor of closeness/eeling close, but the loading of "we"-ness and perceived
similarity onto this first factor suggested more than just an affective response of
closeness; it suggested a perceptual component of overlap as well. Hence, the label
perceived closeness seemed more descriptive of what the items on this factor were
tapping.
The second rotated factor also supported my hypothesis that Davis et al.' s (1996)
and Batson et al.' s (1997) measures of self-other overlap would constitute a separate
factor. Because Davis et al.' s (1996) three adjective overlap measures (i.e., overlap on
neutral, positive, and negative traits) and Batson et al. 's (1997) absolute difference in
attributes all assessed self-other overlap at the level of attributes and personality, I labeled
this factor attribute overlap. Results also indicated that the attribute overlap factor was
unrelated to the other two factors ofperceived closeness and behaving close. As Figure I
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indicates, neither the path between this factor and perceived closeness nor the path with
behaving close was statistically significant.
Finally, I tested the alternative hypothesis that all of these measures loaded on the
same factor (i.e., a uni-dimensional model of self-other overlap). Using structural
equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation, fit indices indicated that a
single-factor structure of these 11 measures of self-other overlap fit the data very poorly,
"l (44, n = 142) = 202.6,p < .001, CFI = .56, RMSEA =.16 (90% CI .14-.18), SRMR =
.11. Not surprisingly, results of the chi-square difference test indicated that the three-
factor solution ofperceive closeness, behaving close, and attribute overlap fit the data
significantly better than the uni-dimensional model, X2D(2) = 137.8,p < .01
Convergent and Discriminant Validity ofSelfOther Overlap Factors
In order to examine possible psychological and interpersonal differences between the
perceived closeness, behaving close, and attribute overlap factors (i.e., Hypothesis 2), I
correlated the three factor scores from the confirmatory factor analysis with participants'
impressions of their relationship with their best friend and the five individual difference
measures mentioned previously. As Table 3 indicates, the three self-other overlap factors
showed a clear difference in their pattern of correlates with these variables. The perceived
closeness factor significantly and positively correlated with most ofthe relationship
quality measures - liking, caring, and how much time participants wanted to spend with
their best fi·iend. One notable exception was that perceived closeness was not
significantly correlated with amount of time that the participant had known his or her best
friend. Instead, behaving close was the only factor correlated with length of time, and
surprisingly, this relationship was negative. Perceived closeness also was not
significantly correlated with any of the individual difference measures or their
corresponding sub-scales.
Table 3. Correlation of self-other overlap factors with relationship quality items and
individual-difference measures.
Perceived Behaving Attribute
Measures Closeness Close Overlap
Relationship Quality Measures
Liking .27** .15 .045
Caring .32** .15 .19*
Want to Spend Time with Best Friend .50** .29** .20*
Time Have Known Best Friend .083 -.26** -.13
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Empathic Concern
Perspective Taking
Self-Reported Altruism
Autism Quotient
.004
.003
.017
.003
-.047 .092
-.025 .004
.003 .12
-.11 -.21 *
Adult Attachment Questionnaire
Avoidance
Ambivalence
Self Consciousness Scale
Public self-consciousness
Private self-consciousness
Social anxiety
* p < .05
**p<.OI
-.11
-.06
.051
.032
.007
-.14
-.15
-.14
-.072
-.13
-.12
-.082
.014
.001
-.24**
Attribute overlap was only correlated with the relationship-quality measures of
caring and wanting to spend time with the best friend in the future. However, these
correlations were smaller in size than the relationship between perceived closeness and
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the relationship quality items. On the other hand, attribute overlap was significantly
correlated with some of the individual-difference measures. Specifically, this factor was
negatively correlated with scores on the social anxiety subscale of the Self-Consciousness
Scale and with autistic tendencies (as measured by the Autism Quotient).
Factor Analysis ofAcquaintance
Turning now to self-other overlap with non-close other, I examined whether or
not the factor structure for the acquaintance was similar to that found for the best friend.
The correlation matrix of the 11 items of self-other overlap completed for participants'
acquaintances are provided in Table 4.7 I first attempted to fit the 3-factor solution that
was found for the best friend on the data for the acquaintance. Using maximum
likelihood estimation8, results indicated that this model did not fit the acquaintance data
as well as the best friend data, X2 (41, n = 142) = 73.2,p < .01, CFI = .88, RMSEA = .074
(90% CI .046-.10), SRMR = .07. Adjective overlap of negative traits no long
significantly loaded on the attribute overlap factor for acquaintance, and instead, the
modification indices suggested that perceived similarity should load with the other items
on the perceived closeness factor. However, chi-square difference test indicated that this
three-factor solution still fit the data significantly better than the uni-dimensional model,
X2o(3) = 18.9,p < .01.
7 Initial inspection of the data revealed that many of the self-other overlap measures for the acquaintance
were skewed. The following transformations were used because they improved the normality of these
items the most: 1) a natural log transformation was calculated on the scores of the "we"-ness, RCI:Strength,
dynamic lOS, and the absolute difference in attributes, 2) the negative inverse was calculated for the lOS,
and 3) a log + 1 transformation was calculated for the adjective overlap of negative traits, RCl:Diversity,
and RCI:Frequency variables.
8 Standardized scores of the self-other overlap measures for the acquaintance were used in this analysis.
Table 4. Correlation matrix of self-other overlap measures for acquaintance.
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. lOS
2. Dynamic lOS .41 **
3. "We"-ness .59** .28**
4. Perceived Similarity .42** .31 ** .44**
5. RCl:Strength .44** .16 .43** .23**
6. RCl:Diversity .31 ** .30** .25** .20* .30**
7. RCl:Frequency .29* .24 .29* .22 .25* .50**
8. Adjective Overlap, Neg Traits .017 -.035 -.075 -.10 .032 .12 .12
9. Adjective Overlap, Neu Traits .17 .16 .19* .22* .11 .071 .27* .43**
10. Adjective Overlap, Pos Traits .24** .28** .29** .39** .19* .16 .29* -.065 .26**
11. Abs Diff of Attributes .28** .20* .27** .34** .10 .14 .18 -.095 .19* .28**
* P < .05
**p<.OI
V,)
>-'
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Exploratory factor analysis using principle components extraction and an oblique
rotation on these variables extracted three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1
(eigenvalues of the 11 principal components were 3.50,1.45,1.18, .97, .80, .74, .59, .54,
.47, .41, and .35). This first unrotated factor explained 31.8% of the variance, while the
other two factors explained 13.2% and 10.7% of the variance, respectively. As seen in
Table 5, this first rotated factor appeared to combine the perceived closeness and
behaving close factors extracted for the best friend. All three subscales from the RCI
Table 5. Factor loadings on structure matrix of self-other overlap measures for
acquaintance.
Measures Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1. lOS .70 -.039 -.53
2. Dynamic lOS .15 .003 -.68
3. "We"-ness .64 -.089 -.57
4. Perceived Similarity .36 -.038 -.75
5. RCI:Strength .70 -.034 -.20
6. RCI:Diversity .74 .17 -.11
7. RCI:Frequency .63 .36 -.27
8. Adjective Overlap, Neg Traits .095 .84 .18
9. Adjective Overlap, Neu Traits .14 .78 -.41
10. Adjective Overlap, Pos Traits .25 .13 -.69
11. Abs Diff of Attributes .15 .003 -.68
(diversity, strength, and frequency), lOS, and "we"-ness all loaded highest on this first
factor. There was also some evidence that these measures of self-other overlap tapped
different facets of this construct, even in the context of an acquaintance. In particular,
adjective overlap of negative and neutral traits continued to load on a second factor that
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was not correlated with the other factors (inter-factor correlations less than .09), similar
to the factor structure for the best friend. Surprisingly, the other items that had loaded on
the attribute overlapfactor for the best friend (adjective overlap of positive traits and
absolute difference of attributes), loaded on the third factor with perceived similarity for
the acquaintance. Several items that loaded on this factor also loaded on the first factor.
As a result, these two factors were moderately correlated with each other (inter-factor
correlation of .34). Unf0l1unately, the data for the acquaintance was highly skewed and
much less variable, compared to the data for the best friend. As described in more detail
below, these issues of non-normality of the data and restriction of range may have
contributed to the different factor structure found for the acquaintance. As such, these
results should be interpreted with some caution until they can be replicated.
Discussion
The main goal of Study 1 was to examine whether or not previous measures of
self-other overlap used in the past published literature were all measuring the same
construct. Based on the previous research, I hypothesized that these past measures
actually tap different facets of self-other overlap, and that at least two different groupings
would occur - one involving the lOS, "we"-ness, RCI:Strength and perceived similarity,
and another grouping including the measures of attribute overlap developed by Davis et
al. (1996) and Batson et al. (1997). Upon examination of participants' responses for their
best friend, a factor analysis of these items provided strong evidence that these items
indeed tapped different aspects of self-other overlap. Rather than extracting a uni-
dimensional factor, these items separated into three factors that I have labeled perceived
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closeness, behaving close and attribute overlap. The factor structure ofperceived
closeness and behaving close in this study were similar to previous findings of a two-
factor structure of closeness using the same variables in the Aron et al. (1992) study, and
is where I took these labels. A third factor (that was not correlated with these other two
factors) also was identified and included those items that assessed self-other overlap at
the level of personality traits and attributes. I called this factor attribute overlap.
Construct Validity ofFactors
One alternative hypothesis is that these factors only represent different methods
for measuring self-other overlap (i.e., adjective traits versus other), and are not
substantially different from each other conceptually. However, several findings support
the idea that these two factors are conceptually different and not simply due to method
variance. First, if method variance was the sole reason for these different factors (i.e.,
these measures of self-other overlap were actually tapping the same uni-dimensional
construct), then these factors should have been inter-correlated with each other.
Although the model tested in this study assumed that these latent factors would be
correlated, I actually found that attribute overlap was not correlated with either perceived
closeness or behaving close for one's best friend.
Second, although the attribute overlap factor consisted of measures of self-other
overlap that assessed personality traits, the method for assessing this overlap also differed
greatly among the measures. The Davis et al. (1996) approach for measuring self-other
overlap involved administering an adjective checklist for both self and target several days
or weeks apart from each other and then calculating the percentage oftraits selected that
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were shared for both. In contrast, the Batson et al. (1997) measure of self-other overlap
included a pre-selected list of personality traits for which participants used a Likert-scale
format to rate the extent that each trait described themselves or the target.
Instead, one possible conceptual difference between these factors of self-other
overlap is the extent that participants perceived any overlap with the target person. For
both the perceived closeness and behaving close factors, all of the items specifically
asked participants about their perceptions of self-other overlap with the target. Not
surprisingly, both this study and the Aron et al. (1992) study found these two factors to be
correlated with each other. In contrast, participants likely had no idea that the items on
the attribute overlap factor were measuring self-other overlap. Neither Davis et al. 's
(1996) adjective overlap measure nor Batson et al.' s (1997) difference score of attributes
asked for participants' perception about the relationship with the target. Rather, overlap
was assessed by having participants complete two separate questionnaires - one for the
self; one for the target. Furthermore, for both the Davis et al. 's (1996) adj ective overlap
measure and Batson et al.' s (1997) difference score of attributes, these questionnaires
were completed several days apart - and for some participants, as part of an umelated
study - reducing the likelihood that participants would be biased by their earlier
responses.
Psychologicallrnplications ofDifferent Facets ofSelf-Other Overlap
Most importantly, if the different factors found were solely due to method
variance, it is unclear how this could explain the different pattern of correlations between
the factors and the individual difference measures and relationship quality items also
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collected in this study. All three factors were positively associated with several markers
of relationship quality, demonstrating the general importance of self-other overlap in
promoting rewarding and long-lasting relationships (Aron & Aron, 1985; Aron et aI.,
1992; Aron & Freely, 1999). However, specific aspects ofrelationship quality differed in
their association with the three different factors of self-other overlap. Of the three
aspects of self-other overlap, perceived closeness appeared to be the most reliable
predictor of relationship quality. Although this facet of self-other overlap was not
associated with the actual length of time that the participant had known his or her best
friend, this null result is actually consistent with Aron and colleague's (1997) theory that
feelings of closeness are influenced by the quality rather than the quantity of interactions
with the other person.
In fact, the only factor of self-other overlap that was significantly correlated with
length of time was behaving close - and unexpectedly, this was a negative relationship!
One possible explanation for the negative correlation between behaving close and length
of the relationship is that time spent together doing activities together is particularly
important at the beginning of relationship. Much like a "honeymoon" phase, these shared
activities help lay the foundation of increased closeness and self-other overlap by creating
a shared history with the other person as well as providing a wealth of information about
the other person's past history, thoughts and feelings, and attitudes. In support of this
idea, Aron et aI. (1997) have demonstrated that they can "manipulate" closeness and
accelerate the process of becoming close by having participants engage in conversations
that require them to incrementally reveal more personal information to the other person.
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However, once a certain level of intimacy and self-other overlap is achieved through
frequent engagement of diverse shared activities with the other person, other aspects of
self-other overlap (such as perceived closeness and/or attribute overlap) may become
increasingly important in the relationship. Consequently, the negative correlation
between behaving close and length of the relationship may be due to the fact that this
facet of self-other overlap becomes less important over time and is replaced by other
facets of self-other overlap that predict long-term satisfaction with the relationship. A
future research direction would be to examine whether or not perceived closeness,
behaving close, and attribute overlap develop at different rates in the relationship, and if
so, whether or not time moderates their influence on the status of the relationship.
Among the individual-difference measures that were administered, I was
particularly interested in the possible relationship between three factors of self-other
overlap and individual differences in empathic concern and perspective taking. None of
these factors were significantly associated with general tendencies in experiencing
empathic concern or attempts at taking the perspective of others. On the other hand,
scores on the attribute overlap factor were associated with experiencing less social
anxiety and less endorsement of autistic tendencies. This pattern of correlations suggests
that those who grow close to their friends and view others as similar to the self also tend
to be highly social-functioning individuals.
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Structure ofSelf-Other Overlap with Non-Close Others
Some have cautioned against adapting measures of self-other overlap from the
close relationship literature for use with non-close others, as participants may interpret
the measures differently for different targets (Batson et aI., 1997). Another goal of Study
1 was to pursue this question by comparing the factor structure of self-other overlap
measures completed for one's best friend with those completed for an acquaintance. A
multi-dimensional factor structure of self-other overlap was replicated for both target
people, leading us to conclude that participants appeared to make a distinction between
overlap of personality traits and attributes (especially negative and neutral traits) versus
overlap related to perceptions or feelings of closeness in the same way when responding
about their best friend or an acquaintance.
On the other hand, the findings also indicated that the factor structures of self-
other overlap for the two targets were not identical, suggesting that the structure of
overlap is influenced by the relationship context. This extends the previous validity study
of the lOS by Aran et ai. (1992), which only examined the structure of closeness for close
others. Study 1 suggests that this distinction betweenfeefing close and behaving close
may not exist in the context of non-close relationships, such as an acquaintance. One
possibility is that these different facets of self-other overlap do not differentiate and split
off until later in a relationship. The target also appeared to change the attribute overlap
factor somewhat. There was compelling evidence in both the best friend and
acquaintance factor analyses that Davis et al.'s (1996) adjective overlap and Batson et
aI.' s (1997) absolute difference of attributes were conceptually different from those
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measures loading on the perceived overlap factor. However, these measures all hung
together to constitute a second factor in the best friend analysis, but appeared to split in
two for the acquaintance, apparently based in part on the valence of the attributes.
Caution should be used in interpreting the results for the acquaintance, as the data
were very skewed for most of the self-other overlap items. In a related issue, there was
much less variability in responses to these items for the acquaintance, relative to the
responses for one's best friend. Thus, issues with restriction of range may account for the
different pattern of correlations and factor structure among the self-other overlap items
for the acquaintance. This unintended limitation was possibly due to the clear operational
definition of "acquaintance" provided to the participants. In order to help participants
think of someone that they knew somewhat well and spent time with, but who was still
considered a "non-close" other, I provided explicit instructions about the type of target
person that fit this definition ("a friend of a friend"). In contrast, participants were given
complete freedom to choose anyone that they considered a "best friend" - such as their
current roommate, best friend from high school, or even a girlfriend or boyfriend.
Participants may have been more uniform in their selection of a target person that fit this
study's definition of an "acquaintance," which may have limited variability and hindered
attempts to examine the relationship among these different measures of self-other overlap
for non-close others.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 2: THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-OTHER OVERLAP
AND PERSPECTIVE TAKING
Introduction
Study 1 demonstrated that several measures of self-other overlap (many of which
had been used in studies related to perspective-taking) loaded onto several different
factors. An initial attempt was also made to examine whether or not these different
factors of self-other overlap were related to perspective taking. Study 1 found that
perceived closeness, behaving close, and attribute overlap were not associated with self-
reported tendencies in perspective taking or empathic concern. The purpose of Study 2
was to provide a more direct test to examine the possible relationship between
perspective taking and these different facets of self-other overlap. Specifically, would the
manipulation of perspective taking affect these factors of self-other overlap to the same
degree or differently?
As mentioned previously, some researchers have hypothesized that taking the
perspective of another person can set in motion the same qualities of self-other overlap
that are found to a more elaborate degree between partners in a close relationship
(Cialdini et al., 1997; Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Maner, et al.,
2002; Neuberg et al., 1997). Accordingly, several studies have found that participants
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who took the perspective of another person demonstrated greater self-other overlap with
that person, as compared to those who did not take that person's perspective (Davis et aI.,
1997; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Galinsky, et aI., 2005; Galinsky, Wang, & Ku,
2008).
However, other studies have not found this relationship between perspective-
taking and self-other overlap. Batson et aI. (1997) found that perspective-taking
instructions marginally affected scores on the lOS but not their measure of self-other
overlap based on mean absolute difference of attributes or a measure about perceived
similarity with the other person. Instead, Batson (1987, 1991) has hypothesized that
empathy (which is often evoked by perspective-taking) actually leads to self-other
distinctiveness rather than self-other overlap. Batson et aI. (1997) did find a non-
significant trend for participants in the perspective-taking condition to have a larger
mean difference scores than participants in the control condition, which they interpreted
as evidence that perspective taking actually leads to self-other differentiation.
Connecting this research with the results from Study 1, four of the five self-other
overlap items that loaded on the perceived closeness factor - lOS, dynamic lOS, "we"-
ness, and perceived similarity - have been shown to be affected by perspective taking
(Batson et aI., 1997; Cialdini et aI., 1997; Goldberg & Cialdini, 2008; Myers & Hodges,
2006; 2009). On the other hand, evidence suggests that attribute overlap may be less
influenced by perspective taking. As mentioned previously, Batson et aI. (1997) did not
find that a perspective-taking manipulation affected scores on their absolute difference
score of attributes. Regarding the effect of perspective taking on their adjective checklist
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overlap, Davis et al. (1996) found that perspective taking increased self-other overlap of
positive traits, but not overlap for negative or neutral traits. Thus, of the four items that
loaded on the attribute overlap factor for the best friend in Study 1, past research has
shown only one ofthem to be affected by perspective taking.
The general prediction of Study 2 was that the contradictory findings regarding
perspective taking and self-other overlap could be partially explained by the fact that
researchers have been measuring different types of self-other overlap, and that
perspective taking affects only some of them. In light of the findings provided in Study 1
and how they related to the past literature, I made the following hypotheses:
Hypotheses and Rationale
Hypothesis 1: Relative to the Control Condition, Perspective Taking Will Primarily
Enhance Feelings ofCloseness and Will Have Less Effect on Attribute Overlap.
In this study, a standard perspective-taking manipulation was used in which
participants were given different instructions to watch a person on video. Participants
then completed all of the same measures of self-other overlap from Study 1, except for
the RCI. The reason for excluding the RCI was two-fold: 1) I wanted to focus
exclusively on those measures of self-other overlap that had been used previously in the
perspective-taking literature, which the RCI had not, and 2) The RCI specifically
measures closeness with another person in an on-going relationship. The target person
used in this study was a stranger whom none of the participants knew. Thus, it would
have been impossible or at best strange for participants to answer most if not all of the
questions on the RCI.
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Hypothesis 2: The Factor Structure ofSel.fOther Overlap Found in Study 1 Will Be
Replicated in Study 2.
Using a new sample and a different target person, I still expected to find that our
measures of self-other overlap tap at least two distinct facets of overlap. One factor
would consist of items such as the lOS, dynamic lOS, "we"-ness, and perceived
similarity - the factor labeled perceived closeness in Study 1. Another factor would
consist of the self-other overlap items that assess overlap more indirectly and at the
personality trait level (i.e., attribute overlap).
Method
Participants
Participants were 118 undergraduates (80% female) from the University of
Oregon who participated in exchange for course credit. Demographic makeup was
similar to Study 1, with primarily Caucasian participants. Eight participants reported that
English was not their primary language (time spent speaking English ranged from 2 to 14
years), but results did not differ significantly when they were removed from the analyses.
Their data were included in the final analyses reported below.
Procedure
The first part of this study replicated the procedure from Study 1. Several days
before the main part of the study, participants completed Davis et al.'s (1996) adjective
checklist for themselves either as part of a general subject pool prescreening at the
beginning of the term or as a separate "Part I" of the study that occurred at least 7 days
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before participants returned to the lab.9 Upon entering the lab to do the main study,
participants first completed several individual difference measures on the computer
unrelated to this study. Participants also rated themselves on the 16 attributes from the
Batson et al. (1997) study.
The experimenter then told participants that they would watch a short video of a
person named Lisa talking about her social and academic experiences since starting
college. This video was the same stimulus video used by Davis et al. (1996) as their
perspective-taking target. This target person was a female actor posing as a freshmen
university student. As part of a script she memorized, this target person described herself
as an average student (making mostly C's) who had done better in high school but was
having some trouble doing well scholastically because of several factors: being on the
volleyball team, having an after-school job, as well as admitting to engaging in social
activities at the expense of school-work. She also described herself as possessing a close
group of friends in high school, but feeling slightly isolated in the larger college
community. Similar to the methodology used by Davis et al. (1996), participants were
randomly assigned to one of two perspective-taking conditions before watching this
video. Those in the "perspective-taking" condition opened a sealed envelope from the
experimenter to find instructions that asked them to imagine how Lisa was feeling about
9 105 participants completed the adjective checklist in the general survey while 13 completed it during Part
I of the study. There were no significant differences on measures of self-other overlap between the two
methodologies.
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what is happening to her by picturing to themselves how she felt in the situation.
Specifically, these participants read the following instructions:
As you watch the interview, please imagine how Lisa feels. Try to take
her perspective in the interview, imagining how she is feeling about what
is happening. While you watch and listen to her, picture to yourself just
how she feels. Concentrate on her in the experience. Think about her
reactions. In your mind's eye visualize clearly and vividly how she feels
in this situation. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all the
information presented. Just imagine how Lisa feels in this situation.
In contrast, participants in the "control" condition received instructions to make careful
observations of Lisa's behavior during the video and to remain objective. These
participants read the following:
As you watch the interview, closely look at and listen to what Lisa does
and says. Make careful observations of all her behavior. Concentrate
your observations on Lisa's mannerisms, posture, movements, facial
expressions, speech characteristics, tone of voice, etc. Notice exactly what
she does, whatever it is. Try to take a neutral perspective, being as
objective as possible about the situation. Do not concern yourself with
Lisa's feelings or views. Do not let yourself get caught up in imagining
what she has been through and how she feels as a result. Just try to
concentrate on the situation objectively.
The experimenter was blind to participants' condition and was instructed not to look at
the instructions when participants had opened their envelopes.
The experimenter left participants alone to watch the video and then complete a
questionnaire packet. This packet included three questions used to assess whether or not
pm1icipants followed their perspective-taking instructions, plus four questions that asked
participants to rate how much they cared about Lisa, how much they liked Lisa, the
degree they would want to spend time with Lisa, and how similar they were to her on a
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Likert-scale from 1 ("not at all") to 9 ("extremely"). Finally, participants completed all
of the same self-other overlap measures used in Study 1, except for the RCI. Similar to
Study 1, the lOS, "we"-ness, perceived similarity, the reduced Davis et al. (1996)
adjective checklist, and the 16 Batson attributes were in a randomized order within the
packets, while all participants completed the animated lOS for Lisa at the end of the
experimental session.
Results
Replication ofFactor Structure ofSelf-Other Overlap Measures
First, I examined whether or not the factor structure of self-other overlap
identified in Study 1 was replicated when using a standard perspective-taking
manipulation with a stranger as the target. Table 6 provides the correlation matrix for the
8 self-other overlap items included in this study, collapsing across perspective-taking
conditions. Specifically, I hypothesized that a two-factor solution ofperceived closeness
and attribute overlap would fit the data the best (a behaving close factor was not
expected, as the items that loaded on this factor in Study 1 both came from the RCI).
Using structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation, a two-
factor model with the lOS, dynamic lOS, "we"-ness, and perceived similarity loading on
one factor and the Davis et al. (1996) adjective overlap items and Batson et al. (1997)
difference score of attributes loading on the other was tested. The results indicated that
this model did not fit the data well. Instead, exploratory factor analysis using principal
Table 6. Correlation matrix of self-other overlap measures for study 2.
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. lOS
2. Dynamic lOS .45**
3. "We"-ness .61 ** .46**
4. Perceived Similarity .48** .41 ** .61 **
5. Adjective Overlap, Neg Traits .010 -.31 ** .012 -0.13
6. Adjective Overlap, Neu Traits .20 -.037 .15 0.14 .33**
7. Adjective Overlap, Pas Traits .25* .21 * .34** .26** -.14 .053
8. Abs Diff of Attributes .24* .12 .32** .28** .00 .098 .38**
•
;;
* p < .05
** P < .01
.j:::>.
-...l
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Components and an oblique rotation clearly suggested that a three-factor model fit the
data better (eigenvalues for 8 factors were 2.92, 1.46, 1.05, .68, .60, .54, .43, and .32,
respectively),10 Cumulatively, these three factors accounted for 67.9% of the variance in
the data.
As Table 7 indicates, the factor loadings from this study replicated the findings
from Study 1. In spite of the absence of the RCI:Strength item, the remaining items from
the perceived closeness factor in Study 1 (i.e., lOS, dynamic lOS, "we"-ness, and
perceived similarity) continued to load together on the same factor in this study.
Supporting a multi-dimensional construct of self-other overlap suggested by Study 1, the
adjective overlap items and absolute difference of attributes again appeared to be separate
from this first factor. The main difference was that attribute overlap factor in Study 1
split into two factors in this study. The results looked quite a bit like the acquaintance
factor analysis in Study 1, with negative and neutral adjective loading on the second
factor (attribute overlap A) while positive adjective overlap and absolute difference of
attributions loaded on the third factor (attribute overlap B),II Also replicating the factor
structure of self-other overlap found for the acquaintance in Study 1, attribute overlap B
was correlated with the perceived closeness factor (interfactor correlation of .33), but
laDue to a computer error, 16 participants lacked adjective checklist for Lisa, 8 pmticipants were missing
the Batson attribute ratings for Lisa, and 4 were missing scores on the dynamic lOS. Again, the majority of
these participants with missing data were missing it for just one measure of self-other overlap, and
exploratory t-tests found no significant differences between these participants and those with complete
data. Therefore, I again employed a strategy of pair-wise deletion for the factor analysis and estimation of
missing data using maximum likelihood in this study.
[[ Five of the 16 attributes used in the Batson et al. (1996) measure were also adjectives that participants
could have selected on the adjective checklist. One concern is that the adjective overlap items and absolute
difference score of attributes loaded on the same factor because of this shared variance. However, using re-
calculated adjective overlap scores that removed these items yielded identical results as those described in
Study 2.
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attribute overlap A (i.e. negative and neutral adjective overlap) was still distinct from the
other factors (interfactor correlations both less than .056).
Table 7. Factor loadings on structure matrix of self-other overlap measures for study 2.
Perceived Attribute Attribute
Measures Closeness Overlap A Overlap B
l.IOS .81 .18 -.27
2. Dynamic lOS .74 -.35 -.16
3. "We"-ness .83 .14 -.43
4. Perceived Similarity .78 .022 -.36
8. Adjective Overlap, Neg Traits -.17 .83 .065
9. Adjective Overlap, Neu Traits .19 .76 -.11
10. Adjective Overlap, Pos Traits -.32 .096 .81
II. Abs Diff of Attributes -.26 -.12 .84
Perspective-Taking Manipulation on Self-Other Overlap Factors
To examine the effect of perspective taking on self-other overlap, a 2 (perspective
taking condition) x 3 (self-other overlap) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted
with the three factors scores as the within-subjects factor. 12 There was no main effect of
self-other overlap, Wilk's A = .99, F (2,86) = .015, p = .99, Y]2 = .00. Instead, the
hypothesized condition x self-other overlap interaction was significant, Wilk's A = .78, F
(2,86) = 3.l5,p < .05, Y]2 = .068. As Figure 2 indicates, the effect of perspective taking
was in the expected direction for all three factor scores. Participants instructed to take the
perspective of the stranger in the video reported more perceived closeness, attribute
12 1ncluding gender in an earlier repeated-measures ANOYA found that it did not predict self-other overlap.
Subsequently, gender was removed in the final analysis.
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overlap A (negative and neutral adjective overlap), and attribute overlap B (positive
adjective overlap and absolute difference of attributes) than participants in the control
condition. Examination of the individual facets of self-other overlap indicated that
perspective taking had an effect on perceived closeness, t(87) = 5.04, p < .001, and
attribute overlap B, t(87) = 2.90,p < .01, but not on attribute overlap A, t(87) = 1.14, p =
.25.
Perceived
Closeness
0.6
0.4
0.2
0+---'---
-0.2
-0.4
Overlap A Overlap B
Condition
D Perspective Taking
• Control
-0.6+-------------------,
Figure 2. Perspective-taking condition x self-other overlap factor score interaction.
Discussion
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine whether or not perspective taking affected
some - but not all- facets of self-other overlap. In particular, I expected that perspective
taking would have the greatest effect on enhancing feelings of closeness, and much less
effect on attribute overlap. Perspective taking increased self-other overlap in the
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hypothesized direction for all of the factors in Study 2, suggesting that there is a general
relationship between perspective taking and self-other overlap. Generally speaking,
trying to take the perspective of another person's point of view does seem to lead to
enhanced perceptions of self-other overlap with that person. However, consistent with
my hypothesis, the results suggest that perspective taking primarily enhances the
conscious response ofperceived closeness with that other person, with less of an effect
on attribute overlap. In fact, only attribute overlap B (which consisted of adjective
overlap of positive traits and the absolute difference score of attributes) was significantly
affected by perspective taking.
The fact that the attribute overlap factor separated into two factors that differed
on valence, and that only one of those factors was significantly associated with
perspective taking, actually provides insight into some previous findings. Davis et al.
(1996) found that perspective taking significantly increased overlap of positive traits, but
not of negative and neutral traits. Study 2 provided further evidence that the type of trait
is important when discussing "self-other overlap" and its relationship to perspective
taking. These results indicate that an individual who overlaps with another person on
negative and neutral traits will not necessarily overlap with that person on positive traits
as well, or vice versa. As further evidence of this distinction, perspective taking
consistently affects overlap ofpositive traits; it does not make us more likely to see our
negative traits in the other person. In fact, the effect of perspective taking on changes in
attribute overlap B appears to be due primarily to changes in perceived overlap of
positive traits. While Batson et al.'s (1997) measure of self-other overlap also was
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related to this factor (they used the absolute difference in attributes measure),
examination of each measure separately in the current study indicated that perspective
taking had a significant effect on adjective overlap of positive traits, but not on the
absolute difference of attributes (although the means were in the hypothesized direction).
In other words, Davis et al.' s (1996) earlier results make more sense now because they
actually measured two different facets of self-other overlap (called attribute overlap A
and attribute overlap B in Study 2) but only one of them (attribute overlap B) was
influenced by perspective taking in the current study.
One question that remains, however, is how overlap of positive traits is related to
perceived closeness. In this study, the perceived closeness factor was associated with
higher scores on attribute overlap B (i.e., overlap of positive adjectives and absolute
difference of attributes), as evidenced by their high inter-factor correlation. Furthermore,
perspective taking significantly affected both of these factor scores. One intriguing
possibility is that one of these facets of self-other overlap may influence the other. In
other words, perspective taking may appear to contribute to an increased overlap of
positive attributes with the other person but this effect is actually driven by
accompanying feelings of perceived closeness, which then leads to greater overlap of
positive attributes.
Additional Evidence ofSel.fOther Overlap as a Multi-Dimensional Construct
Another important goal of Study 2 was to examine whether or not the structure of
self-other overlap from Study 1 could be replicated in a different paradigm, where the
participants did not know the other person, and where closeness was manipulated via
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perspective-taking instructions. The results for the factor structure of self-other overlap in
Study 2 strongly support the perceived closeness factor found in Study 1. In spite of the
removal of the ReI items from Study 2, the remaining items from this factor continued to
load together, just as they did in the factor analyses for the best friend and acquaintance
in Study 1. In terms of replicating the attribute overlap factor found in Study 1, results
from Study 2 again supported the idea that Davis et al. 's (1996) and Batson et al.' s (1997)
measures of self-other overlap are conceptually different from those that loaded on the
perceived closeness factor, especially adjective overlap of negative and neutral traits.
In conclusion, Study 1 and 2 provided conclusive evidence that self-other overlap
is a multi-faceted construct. Directly relevant to work done in the perspective-taking
literature, Study 2 further demonstrated that a key psychological difference among the
different facets of self-other overlap is the extent that they are affected by attempts at
perspective taking. Specifically, perspective taking enhances both perceived closeness as
well as overlap on positive traits. After having addressed the question of whether or not
perspective taking affects certain aspects of self-other overlap more than others, I next
turn to another question about perspective taking and self-other overlap that has not been
fully answered - does perspective taking lead to changes in one's self-concept through its
effects on self-other overlap? In other words, does perspective taking make one become
more like the other person, and if so, is this mediated by enhanced self-other overlap?
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 3: PERSPECTIVE TAKING ON THE DIRECTION
OF SELF-OTHER OVERLAP
Introduction
The purpose of Studies 1 and 2 was to clarify the concept of "self-other overlap"
by examining whether or not this construct consisted of distinct factors that were
differentially affected by perspective taking. However, another important question about
self-other overlap that still remains unanswered is the direction in which this overlap
occurs. Using the metaphor of the self and other as two separate circles, overlap can
occur in several different ways. One way is by moving the "other" circle closer to the
"self' circle. Another way is to move the "self' circle closer to the "other" circle.
Although the actual amount of overlap might be the same in both instances, there are
different interpersonal and psychological implications associated with the direction in
which self-other overlap can occur (e.g., Galinsky et aI., 2005; 2008).
In the perspective-taking literature, much of the research has focused on idea that
overlap is due to perceptions that the other person becomes more "self-like." Examining
the overlap of traits shared between oneself and another person, several studies -
including Study 2 of this dissertation - have consistently found that perspective taking
leads to a greater percentage of self-descriptive traits to be used in describing the other
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person and not an increased overlap in terms of the percentage of target-descriptive traits
shared with the self (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Davis et aI., 1996; Myers & Hodges,
2006). In terms of the interpersonal consequences of seeing the other as more "self-like,"
this type of overlap has been associated with more positive evaluations of the target
person as well as decreased stereotyping of the target person and his or her group
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini et aI., 1997; Neuberg
et aI., 1997) have similarly defined self-other overlap in terms of seeing more of oneself
in the other, and have found evidence that seeing the other as more "self-like" accounts
for the relationship between empathic feelings and willingness to provide help. Viewing
the other person as increasingly more like the self appears akin to the concept of
"projection." There is extensive evidence documenting that projection is a common
strategy that people use in order to infer the thoughts and feelings of another person
(Ames, 2004; Davis et aI., 1997; Davis, Soderlund, Cole, Gadol, Kute, Myers, &
Weihing, 2004; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Houston, 1990; Nickerson,
1999; Van Boven & Lowenstein, 2003). In fact, some have theorized that using the self
as a template is the default strategy that people use to understand another's point of view
and only change this strategy when there is clear evidence that the other person is
dissimilar to oneself (Nickerson, 1999).
In spite of this strong claim that the self is the primary reference point when
trying to make mental inferences about others, there is also some evidence suggesting
that perceptions of the self can become more "other-like." In particular, Aron and
colleagues have described the type of self-other overlap that occurs in close relationship
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as an "expansion" of the self in which characteristics of the other person become
increasingly included into one's own self-concept (Aron & Aron, 1986; 1996; 1997;
Aron et aI., 1991; Aron & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001; Tropp & Wright, 2001). For
example, Mashek et aI. (2003) found that participants who rated traits for themselves, a
close other, and a less-close other and then were asked to remember for which target they
rated the trait showed significantly more source confusion between themselves and the
close other versus confusion between the less-close person and themselves. Mashek et aI.
(2003) interpreted this finding as evidence that as mental representations of the self and
other overlap with each other in a close relationship, unique aspects of the other person
become implicitly incorporated into the self-concept. Evidence also suggests that people
can overlap with an in-group by incorporating attributes of the group into the self (Smith,
Coats, & Walling, 1999). Thus, one psychological implication of perceiving the self as
more "other-like" (in contrast to overlapping with another person by perceiving him or
her as more "self-like") is that the self-concept changes in such a way that the self
becomes more similar to the other person. However, none of the previously-mentioned
studies examined the role of perspective taking in invoking self-other overlap in this
direction.
In fact, only three articles were found that specifically examined whether or not
the effect of perspective taking on self-other overlap contributed to aspects of the self
becoming more "other-like." In one study, Goldstein and Cialdini (2007; Study 1) had
participants take the perspective of another person, which led to greater overlap with that
person. Consequently, participants who took the other person's perspective and then
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observed that person freely engaging in some behavior (suggesting that the behavior was
diagnostic of that person' s attributes) were more likely to incorporate those attributes
relevant to the actor's behavior into their own self-concepts. Furthem10re, these changes
in participants' self-concept then contributed to changes in their behavior. While
perspective taking was manipulated in this study, the main focus of Goldstein and
Cialdini's investigation was on how individuals used information acquired by observing
the behaviors of close others to understand the self. Thus, the authors were not
particularly interested in the theory that perspective taking, via increased self-other
overlap, led to the inclusion of others into the self, nor was their article specifically
designed to address this idea.
Two articles from Galinsky and colleagues (Galinsky et aI., 2005; 2008) are
probably the most direct examination of the effect of perspective taking on the direction
of self-other overlap. In fact, these researchers claim that perspective taking can increase
self-other overlap in both directions. Both directions of self-other overlap contribute to
improved social bonds with others, but the pathway by which this outcome is achieved
differs for the two. As mentioned previously, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2002) found that
seeing the other as more "self-like" was associated with less stereotypical judgments
about the target person and his or her group. On the other hand, Galinsky and colleagues
suggest that seeing the self as more "other-like" ironically leads to the perceiver
incorporating those same stereotypical attributes into his or her own self-descriptions and
behavior (Galinsky et aI, 2005; 2008). Consistent with this hypothesis, Galinsky and
colleagues (2005, 2008) found that participants who took the perspective of a target
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person were more likely to endorse traits for themselves that were identified as
stereotypical of the target person (i.e., more attractive and sexy if it the target person was
a cheerleader; more analytical, methodological, and smart if the target person was a
professor). Perspective-taking participants also were more likely to act in a manner that
was stereotypical of the target person's group (e.g., acting more competitive and
aggressive in a prisoner's dilemma game after taking the perspective of an African
American male; competitiveness and aggressiveness had identified as stereotypic of
African Americans in an earlier pilot study).
Although clearly suggestive that perspective taking can lead to the type of "self-
expansion" described by Aron and his colleagues, the work by Galinsky and colleagues is
limited by fact that they only examine the inclusion of stereotypical traits of the target
person into the self. Currently, very little is known about whether or not perspective
taking can lead to the inclusion of other aspects of another person into the self, such as
attitudes and beliefs. Galinsky and colleagues do not claim that the effect of perspective
taking on becoming more "other-like" is only confined to the realm of attributes. In fact,
there is some suggestive evidence from Finlay and Stephan (2006) that taking the
perspective of an outgroup member can lead to changes in the perceiver's attitudes that
are more similar to that outgroup. Rather, one possible reason why the inclusion of the
target's attitudes and beliefs into the self was not examined by Galinsky and colleagues is
because this kind of information about the target person was not available to the
participants.
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This highlights another limitation of the previous research in this area: Of the nine
studies described in the Galinsky et al. (2008) article, only one study involved any sort of
"social interaction" in the traditional sense. In this study, participants listened to an audio
recording of a professor talk about his typical day. For all of the other studies,
participants were simply shown a black and white photo of a target person and asked to
imagine a typical day in the life of that person. With no additional information about the
specific thoughts or feelings of that target person provided, participants in this situation
likely had to rely heavily on stereotypes in trying to imagine the person's perspective, as
this would be the only source of information available to the participants. Thus, there is
good reason to wonder if these results were due primarily to situational demands created
in these studies rather than an ecologically valid effect of perspective taking on self-other
overlap.
Another limitation in the Galinsky et al. (2005; 2008) studies is that change in
self-concept was never explicitly measured in these studies. Instead, the researchers only
compared the mean ratings of stereotypical attributes for the self between participants in
the perspective-taking condition versus a comparison group. Thus, it is not possible to
quantify the amount of self-concept change that occurred due to perspective taking, nor is
it possible to determine that this change was due to the participant's perception of the
target person. Stereotypical attributes of the target person were selected during a pre-
testing phase, but the participants themselves never provided their ratings of the target
person on these traits. In sum, the few studies examining whether or not perspective
taking can lead to overlap in which the self becomes more "other-like" have provided
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only indirect evidence of this effect. They have not demonstrated that the perceptions of
the other person directly account for these changes in the self-concept.
Study 3 was designed to address these limitations in several ways. First, this
study examined not only the effect of perspective taking on including attributes of the
other person into the self, but also on incorporating that person's beliefs into the self. In
Study 3, participants rated themselves on attributes that had been pre-identified as being
relevant to the target person, but they also rated their agreement to several belief
statements relevant to the target person. In addition, the amount of self-concept change
and the influence behind this change was directly assessed in this study. By having
participants complete the same attributes and belief statements for themselves twice -
once prior to perspective taking and once after - any change in their attributes or beliefs
due to perspective taking could be quantified. By having participants complete these
same attribute and belief statements for the target person, this study could also
specifically examine whether or not change in participants' self-concept was actually in
the direction toward their perceptions of the target person at time 2.
Thus, the main goal of this study was to examine whether perspective taking
could lead to changes in participants' attitudes and beliefs such that they became more
similar to target person. Furthermore, I predicted that the effect of perspective on self-
concept change would be mediated by perceptions of greater self-other overlap with the
target person. To examine this relationship among perspective taking, self-other overlap,
and self-concept change, I tested the following hypotheses:
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Hypotheses and Rationale
Hypothesis J: Relative to the Control Condition, Perspective Taking Would Be
Associated With Greater Perceived Closeness and Overlap ofPositive Traits.
Replicating the previous two studies, I expected to find evidence that the
measures of self-other overlap included in this study would tap two distinct aspects of
self-other overlap - perceived closeness and attribute overlap. Furthermore, based on the
results from Study 2, I expected that perspective-taking instructions would only affect
perceived closeness and the overlap of positive traits with the target person.
Hypothesis 2: Relative to the Control Condition, Perspective Taking Would Be
Associated With Responses for the Se(!at Time 2 That Were Predicted to a Greater
Extent by Participants' Responsesfor the Target Person.
As evidence that perspective taking contributed to perceptions of the self
becoming more "other-like," I expected that participants' self-responses at time 2 in the
perspective-taking condition would change in the direction toward the target person and
become more similar to their responses for that person. Furthermore, I predicted that this
effect would extend to both attributes used to describe the self as well as self-beliefs.
Hypothesis 3: Perceptions ofSe(f-Other Overlap Would Also Predict Self-Concept
Change and Mediate the Effect ofPerspective Taking.
I predicted that self-other overlap also would contribute to participants' responses
for the self that were increasingly influenced by their responses for the target person.
While I had no strong theoretical basis to believe that one aspect of self-other overlap in
particular would predict self-concept change, Goldstein and Cialdini (2007; study 2)
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found that perceived similarity predicted the incorporation of attributes relevant to the
actor's behavior into the participant's self-concepts, and perceived similarity consistently
loaded on the perceived closeness factor in the first two studies of this dissertation
Assuming that both perspective taking and self-other overlap predict self-concept
change, I also hypothesized that the underlying mechanism connecting perspective taking
with self-concept change would be enhanced self-other overlap. Furthermore, Hypothesis
3b predicts that only self-other overlap will mediate this relationship between perspective
taking and self-concept change; mediations will not be accounted for by some other
related consequence of perspective taking. For example, past research has demonstrated
that self-other overlap and empathic concern are correlated concepts and that their effect
on pro-social outcomes can vary depending on whether these two variables are examined
in isolation or simultaneously (Cialdini et aI., 1997; Maner et aI., 2002). Past research
has also documented a strong connection between perspective taking and improved
attitudes toward the target person (Batson et aI., 1997; 2002; Galinsky & Moskowitz,
2000), which could also be a mediator for self-concept change rather than self-other
overlap. Thus, to examine the unique effect of self-other overlap on self-concept change,
Study 3 included self-other overlap, empathic concern, and positive attitudes toward the
target person as simultaneous predictors of self-concept change. I predicted that the
effect of self-other overlap in evoking self-concept change would remain after accounting
for empathic concern and positive attitudes toward the target person, and that empathy
and positive attitude would not mediate the relationship between perspective taking and
self-concept change.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 118 undergraduates (75% female) from the University of
Oregon who participated in exchange for course credit. Demographic makeup was
similar to the previous studies, with primarily Caucasian participants. Four participants
reported that English was not their primary language (years spent speaking English
ranged from 3 to 13 years), but results did not differ significantly when they were
removed from the analyses, so their data were included in the final analyses.
Procedure
As part of a general subject pool prescreening, participants completed Davis et
aI.'s (1996) adjective checklist for themselves at the beginning of the academic term.
Time 1: Online Survey
Apart from the prescreening, but at least 5 days before entering the lab to
complete the rest of the study, participants also completed several online measures. Two
of them were measures assessing individual differences in empathy and perspective
taking (the Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983) and self-reported altruism
(Rushton et aI., 1989).
Participants also rated themselves on 16 attributes from 1 ("not at all") to 9
("extremely"). Because the target person in this study (described in more detail below)
was a researcher, eight of these attributes (intelligent, knowledgeable, methodological,
industrious, opinionated, deliberate, critical ofothers, and preoccupied) were selected
because pre-testing indicated that they were considered representative of researchers. In
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contrast, the remaining eight attributes (impulsive, attractive, relaxed, wholesome,
carefree, conforming, resen(ful, and complaining) were selected because pre-testing
indicated that they were considered very umepresentative of a researcher. Additionally, I
ensured that these two groups of attributes included both positive- and negative-valence
traits. I included attributes that were both representative and umepresentative of
researchers because past work examining whether self-other overlap makes the self as
more "other-like" has suggested that traits relevant to the target person would be most
likely to be included in the self (Aron & Aron, 1986; Galinsky et aI., 2008).
The final set of measures in the online survey asked participants to rate the extent
to which they agreed with 11 belief statements on a II-point scale from 1 ("not at all") to
11 ("extremely"). Appendix A provides a full list of these statements. These statements
were generated in conjunction with the target stimulus person (who is described in more
detail below) to assess general themes and beliefs related to the target person's interview.
A three-step process was used to create the final list of belief statements. First, the
researcher and target person watched the interview several times through. Then, the
researcher and target person both created several belief statements that they thought were
implied in the interview. Finally, both people met to discuss their respective lists and
selected those beliefs statements that they both agreed were implied in the interview but
not explicitly stated by the target person.
Time 2: Main Study
Upon entering the lab to complete the main part of the study, participants were
seated in front of an individual computer station. All of the study measures and
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instructions were administered on the computer. First, participants completed several
demographic information questions. Then, the experimenter told them that they would
watch a short video of a person talking about his job as a researcher. Before watching the
video, participants were randomly assigned to one of two perspective-taking instructions
that they read on the screen. Participants in the "perspective-taking" condition read the
following instructions:
For the next few minutes, you will watch an interview about Tom as he
talks about his job as a researcher.
As you watch the interview, please imagine how Tom feels. Try to take
his perspective in the interview, imagining how he is feeling about what is
happening. While you watch and listen to him, picture to yourself just
how he feels. Concentrate on him in the experience. Think about his
reactions. In your mind's eye visualize clearly and vividly how he feels in
this situation. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all the
information presented. Just imagine how Tom feels in this situation.
Participants in the "control" condition read the following instructions:
For the next few minutes, you will watch an interview about Tom as he
talks about his job as a researcher.
As you watch the interview, closely look at and listen to what Tom does
and says. Make careful observations of all his behavior. Concentrate your
observations on Tom's mannerisms, posture, movements, facial
expressions, speech characteristics, tone of voice, etc. Notice exactly what
he does, whatever it is. Try to take a neutral perspective, being as
objective as possible about the situation. Do not concern yourself with
Tom's feelings or views. Do not let yourself get caught up in imagining
what he has been through and how he feels as a result. Just try to
concentrate on the situation objectively.
After thoroughly and completely reading their paI1icuiar instructions, participants
then watched a 7-minute interview of a Caucasian, middle-aged man talking about his
experiences as a researcher. In reality, this person was a faculty member on sabbatical
from a different university who volunteered to be videotaped for this study while
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providing honest answers about his experiences as a researcher. As it turned out, this
person later accepted a job as a full time researcher soon after the interview (illustrating
the authenticity of the target person's responses). The interviewer (who was located off-
camera and never seen) asked the target person several questions related to his job, such
as "please describe your average day as a researcher", "what do you enjoy most as a
researcher?", "is there anything about your job as a researcher that you find difficult or
frustrating?" and "Is there anything about being a researcher that you think others would
find interesting or surprising?"
After watching the video, participants answered three questions designed to
determine whether or not they followed their perspective-taking instructions: "To what
extent did you try to imagine how you felt as if you were Tom?", "To what extent did
you imagine how Tom was feeling?", and "To what extent did you carefully and
objectively observe Tom's behavior?" Participants also rated their perceived similarity to
the target ("in your opinion, to what degree are you and Tom similar?") and the degree
that they would want to spend time with him. Participants answered these five questions
on a 9-point scale from 1 ("not at all") to 9 ("extremely"). Next, participants rated the
target person on 6 tenns (good, bad, like, dislike, negative, and positive) designed to
assess their attitude of him (Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994). Participants answered these
items on a 9-point scale from 1 ("not at all") to 9 ("extremely"). Finally, participants
indicated how much they had experienced 20 specific emotions from 1 ("not at all") to 9
("extremely") while watching the video. This list included 6 items (moved, tender,
warm, soft-hearted, sympathetic, and compassionate) found by previous research to load
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on an "empathic concern" factor (Batson 1987, 1991). The other emotions were as
follows: annoyed, happy, sad, delighted, sorrowful, joyful, disgusted, acceptance, angry,
relaxed, bored, excited, tense, and calm.
After answering the manipulation checks, perceived similarity question, attitude
questions, and emotion items, participants completed the following items in a random
order: 1) the reduced version of the Davis et al.'s (1996) adjective checklist (the same one
used in Studies 1 and 2) for themselves, 2) the adjective checklist for the target person, 3)
the same 16 attribute questions from Part 1 for themselves again, 4) the 16 attribute
questions for the target person, 5) the 11 belief statements from Part 1 for themselves
again, 6) the 11 belief statements based on how they thought the target person would
answer them, 7) Aron's lOS, and 8) the "we"-ness question (used in the previous two
studies). Finally, the last measure that all participants completed was the dynamic lOS.
Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results
The main prediction of Study 3 was that perspective taking would lead to changes
that moved the self-concept in the direction of the target person, and that this effect
would be mediated by greater self-other overlap. The analyses aimed at examining this
prediction are organized into the following sections: 1) Effectiveness of perspective-
taking manipulation, 2) Effect of perspective taking on self-other overlap, 3) Effect of
perspective taking on changes in self-concept, 4) Effect of self-other overlap on changes
in self-concept, and 5) Examination of other possible mediators of change in self-concept.
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Effectiveness ofPer.spective-Taking Manipulation
I checked the effectiveness of the perspective-taking manipulation in three ways.
First, I examined whether or not participants' responses to the three manipulation-check
questions significantly differed by condition. Consistent with my hypotheses,
participants instructed to take the perspective of the target person reported trying harder
to imagine how the target person was feeling (M's = 7.34 and 4.02 for perspective-taking
and control conditions, respectively; F(1,116) = 118.0,p < .001, 112 = .50) as well as
reporting how they would have felt in the situation (M = 6.81) to a significantly greater
degree than those in the control condition (M = 3.96), F(1, 116) = 81.2, p < .001, 112 = .41.
Finally, participants in the control condition (M = 7.35) reported higher means in trying
to carefully and objectively observe the target person than the perspective-taking
condition (M = 6.98), although this difference was not significant, F(1, 116) = 1.98, p =
16,112 = .017.
Second, to assess the effectiveness of my manipulation, I examined whether or
not perspective taking evoked feelings of empathic concern toward the target person.
Consistent with past research, the six empathic concern adjectives (moved, tender, warm,
soft-hearted, sympathy, and compassion) were significantly correlated with each other
and all loaded on one factor. The mean scores of these items were calculated to create a
composite "empathic concern" score (Cronbach's a = .85). As expected, I found that
participants in the perspective-taking condition reported greater feelings of empathy
toward the target person (M= 4.47) than those in the control condition (M= 3.57),
F(1,116) = 10.2,p < .01, 112 = .081.
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Finally, past research has also documented that perspective-taking predicts
improved attitudes about the other person (Batson et aI, 2002; 1997; Galinsky &
Moskowitz, 2000). So, I examined whether or not my perspective-taking manipulation
affected scores on the attitude items. The six attitude items were highly correlated with
each other (r's from .29 to .68), so they were summed to create a composite "attitudes"
score (the negative, bad, and dislike items were re-coded such that higher values on all of
these items indicated a more positive attitude; Cronbach's a = .85). As expected,
participants in the perspective-taking condition had a more positive attitude toward the
target person (M = 44.8) than participants in the control condition (M = 40.7), F(1, 116) =
12.0,p < .01, 11 2 = .094.
Effect ofPerspective Taking on Self-Other Overlap
I next examined the effect of the perspective-taking manipulation on self-other
overlap. Studies 1 and 2 indicated two distinct aspects of overlap - perceived closeness
and attribute overlap. Consistent with those previous studies, a principal components
factor analysis of the seven measures of self-other overlap in Study 3 (lOS, dynamic lOS,
"we"-ness, perceived similarity, positive adjective overlap, negative adjective overlap,
and neutral adjective overlap) using an oblique rotation again suggested that a 2-factor
solution fit the data the best. Table 8 provides the correlation matrix of these self-other
overlap items, collapsing across condition.
Table 8. Correlation matrix of self-other overlap measures for study 3.
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. lOS
2. Dynamic lOS .38**
3. "We"-ness .58** .38**
4. Perceived Similarity .39** .35** .47**
5. Adjective Overlap, Neg Traits -.075 .13 -.006 0.077
6. Adjective Overlap, Neu Traits .14 .059 .15 0.14 .17
7. Adjective Overlap, Pos Traits .24* .21 * .20* .27** .050 .26**
* P < .05
** P < .01
-...l
o
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Only two factors had eigenvalues greater than the traditional cut-off point of 1
(the seven eigenvalues for a principal component analysis were 2.46, 1.21, .91, .80, .65,
.58, and .40) and they accounted for 52% of the total variance. As before, the lOS,
dynamic lOS, "we"-ness item, and perceived similarity all loaded on the first factor (i.e.,
perceived closeness), while negative, and neutral adjective overlap primarily loaded on
the second factor (similar to the attribute overlap A factor from Study 2). Positive
adjective overlap had the highest loading on the second factor but it also loaded
moderately on the first factor in this study. However, structural equation model with
maximum likelihood estimation suggested that the best fitting model had positive
adjective overlap loading on just the attribute overlap factor and that adding a path to
perceived closeness didn't significantly improve the fit of the model. This final model is
provided in Figure 3 and had the following fit indices: X2 (13, n = 118) = 10.2,p = .68,
CFl = 1.0, RMSEA = .00 (90% Cl .00-.073), SRMR = .041.
.49
PERCEIVED
SIMILARITY
./3
ATTRIBUTE
OVERLAP
.62*
.43*
* p < .05
Std. coeftic;ent reported
Figure 3. Two-factor solution of self-other overlap measures in study 3.
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Using the perceived closeness factor scores from the confirmatory factor analysis
as the dependent variable, the perspective-taking group (M = .089) and control group (Nf
= -.098) did not differ significantly differ from each other (F(l,116) = 2.56,p = .11, 112 =
.022), although the difference was in the hypothesized direction. Because the categorical
perspective-taking manipulation did not provide support for hypothesis 1 (i.e., that
perspective taking would be associated with greater perceived closeness), I next
examined whether or not my manipulation-check items predicted perceived closeness.
As mentioned before, participants in the perspective-taking condition reported imagining
how the target person felt and how he or she would have felt in the situation to a greater
extent than participants in the control condition. These two manipulation-check items
were also correlated with each other (r = .84,p < .001, n = 118). Taking the average of
these scores, I created a composite variable that measured participant's self-reported
attempts at trying to take the perspective of the target person (i.e., a "self-reported
perspective taking" score). In support of hypothesis 1, this "self-reported perspective
taking" score was positively correlated with perceived closeness (r = .22, p < .05, n =
118).
To examine the effect of perspective taking on attribute overlap, I conducted a
one-way MANOVA with the self-percentage overlap of positive, negative, and neutral
adjectives (i.e., what percentage of adjectives participants selected for themselves during
the online part of the study were later used to describe the target person) as the three
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within-subject variables13 . This analysis showed a significant main effect ofperspective-
taking manipulation on adjective overlap, Wilk's A= .91, F (3, 107) = 3.51, p < .05, Y]2 =
.09. Specifically, participants in the perspective-taking condition overlapped more with
the target person on positive adjectives (M = 64.3%) than the control condition (M =
55.7%), F(l,109) = 4.23,p < .05, Y]2 = .037. Participants in the perspective-taking
condition also overlapped significantly less with the target person on negative adjectives
(M= 22.5%) than the control condition (M= 25.4%), F(l,109) = 4.87,p < .05, Y]2 = .043.
Similarly, participant's "self-reported perspective taking" score also was significantly
correlated with overlap of positive adjectives (r = .26, P < .05, n = 111) but it was not
significantly correlated with overlap of negative adjectives (r = -.076,p = .43, n = 111).
These results replicate Study 2 and other past research suggesting that perspective taking
primarily increases overlap of positive traits, and not negative or neutral traits (Davis et
al., 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).
Effect ofPerspective Taking on Changes in SelfConcept
Results from the previous section provided partial support for Hypothesis 1.
Specifically, self-reported perspective taking scores were positive associated with
enhanced feelings of closeness and both self-reported perspective taking and the
perspective-taking manipulation led to greater adjective overlap on primarily positive
traits. The analyses in this section examine whether or not perspective taking (both using
the "self-reported perspective taking" score and the perspective-taking manipulation) also
13 Although these three items loaded together on the attribute overlap factor in this study, Study 2 as well as
past research had indicated that they were not all affected by a perspective-taking manipulation to the same
degree (Davis et aI., 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Thus, for this analysis, 1 decided to keep these
items separate rather than use the factor score that combined them together.
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contributes to the changes in the self-concept (Hypothesis 2). I start with a description of
the constructs created to measure self-concept change and then describe the analyses that
examined the effect of perspective taking on any changes in self-concept. Four sets of
analyses are described in this section: 1) the effect of perspective-taking manipulation on
belief-change, 2) the effect of self-reported perspective taking on belief-change, 3) the
effect of perspective-taking manipulation on attribute-change, and 4) the effect of self-
reported perspective taking on attribute-change.
Constructs
Based on participants' responses for themselves at time 1 and their responses for
the target at time 2, I assessed the extent that participants' responses for themselves at
time 2 were influenced either by their prior self-concept or by their perceptions of the
target. For the 11 belief statements, a multiple regression was computed for each
participant, predicting his or her responses at time 2 from self-responses at time 1 and
from responses for the target person. The resulting standardized beta weights were then
used as measures of "belief self consistency" (the self response at time 1 beta) and "belief
change in the direction of the target" (the target person response beta). Thus, the more a
participant's own responses at time 1 predicted his or her responses at time 2, the higher his
or her measure of belief self consistency was. The more a participant's responses for the
target person predicted his or her own responses at time 2, the higher his or her measure of
belief-change (in the direction of the target person) was. Belief self consistency and belief
change were marginally correlated with each other (r = -.19, P = .06, n = 106). This trend
suggested that as participants' responses became more like the target person, they
accordingly became less consistent across time.
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A similar strategy was employed on the 16 attributes to create an overall "attribute-
self-consistency" and "attribute-change in the direction of the target" beta scores. Similar
to the beta scores for the belief statements, these two scores were negatively correlated with
each other (r =-.58,p < .001, n =108). Separate standardized beta weights assessing
attribute self consistency and attribute change (in the direction of the target) were also
calculated for the eight attributes identified during pre-testing as being representative and the
eight attributes considered unrepresentative of researchers. These separate betas were also
both negatively correlated with each other (r =-.67,p < .001, n =106, for the representative
attributes and r = -.33 p < .01, n = 106, for the unrepresentative adjectives).
To test the hypothesis that perspective taking would be associated with responses
for the self at time 2 that were predicted to a greater extent by participants' responses for
the target person (i.e., Hypothesis 2), I first examined the effect of the perspective-taking
manipulation on changes in participants' responses to the belief statements for
themselves as time 2. A 2(manipulation: perspective taking vs. control) x 2(influence:
belief-self-consistency vs. belief-change) repeated-measures ANOVA was run using the
belief-self-consistency and belief-change betas as the within-subjects factor. I predicted
that participants in the perspective-taking condition would have higher "belief-change"
betas and lower "belief-self-consistency" betas, relative to the control condition. This
analysis did not find the hypothesized interaction effect of condition on changes in self-
concept for beliefs (Wilk's A = .99, F(1,1 04) = .90,p = .35, Y]2 = .009).
In the next set of analyses, I then examined the association between participant's
self-reported perspective taking (instead of the categorical manipulated perspective-taking
variable) and the belief-change and belief-self-consistency betas. Examination of the
correlation matrix indicated that self-reported perspective taking was not significantly
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correlated with belief change (r =.071, P = .47, n = 108) or belief self consistency (r =.14,
P = .14, n = 106).
Moving from beliefs to attributes, the third analysis testing Hypothesis 2 examined
the possible effect of perspective-taking manipulation on change in descriptions of self-
attributes. A 2(manipulation: perspective-taking or control) x 2(influence: attribute-self-
consistency vs. attribute-change) x 2(attribute type: representative vs. unrepresentative)
repeated-measures ANOVA was run. In this analysis, the standardized betas of the
overall attribute-self-consistency and attribute-change betas were used as the first within-
subject factor while the second "attribute type" within-subjects factor examined possible
differences based on whether the attributes were representative or unrepresentative of
researchers. Again, I predicted that the perspective-taking manipulation would lead to
higher attribute-change betas and lower attribute-self-consistency betas, relative to the
control condition. However, analyses indicated that there was no significant difference in
overall attribute-change and attribute-self-consistency betas between the two perspective-
taking conditions (Wilk's A = .99, F(l,103) = 1.04,p = .31,112 = .010). Furthermore, no
significant differences in attribute-consistency and attribute-self-consistency betas
between the two conditions emerged if the attributes were separated into "representative"
versus "unrepresentative" attributes (Wilk's A = 1.00, F(l,103) = .39,p = .53, 112 = .004).
The fourth and final analysis examined the association between participant's self-
reported perspective taking and their attribute-change and attribute-consistency betas.
Examination of the correlation matrix indicated that self-reported perspective taking was not
significantly correlated with overall attribute-change (r =-.019, p =.85, n = 108) or overall
attribute-consistency scores (r =-.065, p =.50, n = 108), nor with attribute-change of
specific attributes (r = .018, P =.85, n = 107 for representative attributes; r =-.092, p =.35,
77
n = 106 for unrepresentative attributes). In conclusion, none of the results from these four
analyses provided any support for the hypothesis that perspective taking led to changes in
participant's self-concept such that responses for the self at time 2 would be predicted to a
greater extent by their responses for the target person.
Effect ofSelf-Other Overlap on Changes in Self-Concept
Although perspective taking did not appear to be a predictor of self-concept change,
the next series of analyses examined this study's third hypothesis that self-other overlap
with the target person would lead to changes in the self-concept in the direction toward
their perceptions of that person. In order to test Hypothesis 3, once again four sets of
analyses were conducted: 1) the effect ofperceived closeness on belief-change, 2) the
effect of attribute overlap on belief-change, 3) the effect ofperceived closeness on
attribute-change, and 4) the effect of attribute overlap on attribute-change.
For the first set of analyses, initial inspection of the correlations between the perceived
closeness factor score with belief-self-consistency and belief-change (toward the target)
betas indicated that greater perceived closeness was associated with increased belief-change
at time 2 (r =.24, p < .05, n = 108) but not belief-self-consistency (r =-.013, p =.89, n =
106). To further test the hypothesis that self-other overlap would positively predict belief
change and negatively predict belief self consistency, I separated pal1icipants into two
groups based on a median-split of the perceived closeness factor score. A 2 (perceived
closeness - low vs. high) x 2(inftuence - belief-consi stency vs. belief-change) repeated-
measures ANOVA was run using the belief-self-consistency and belief-change betas as
the within-subjects factor. Similar to the effect of perspective taking on belief-change, I
predicted that participants who experienced high perceived closeness would have higher
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"belief-change" betas and Iower" belief-self-consistency" betas, relative to participants
who experienced little perceived closeness with the target person. In support of Hypothesis
3, this interaction was significant, Wilk's A = .96, F(l,97) = 4.25,p < .05, Y]2 = .042. As
Figure 4 indicates, neither group's beliefs at time 2 were predicted by their earlier
responses at time 2. In contrast, the high perceived closeness group's beliefs for the self
were predicted much more by their responses for the target person than those in the low
perceived closeness group.
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Figure 4. Perceived closeness x influence interaction for belief statements.
The next set of analyses examined whether or not self-other overlap in the form of
attribute overlap predicted changes in participants' beliefs. Examination of the correlation
matrix indicated that the attribute overlap factor score was not significantly correlated with
belief-consistency (r = .025, p = .80, n = 99) or belief-change betas (r = .032, p = .75, n =
101). Furthermore, none of the individual adjective overlap scores (i.e., positive, negative,
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neutral) were significantly associated with belief-consistency or belief-change (r's from -
.096 to .11). Consequently, follow-up analyses using repeated-measures ANOYA was not
necessary for attribute overlap.
The next two sets of analyses repeated the last two analyses, but examined whether
self-other overlap factors predicted changes in participants' descriptions of themselves on
a set of attributes (rather than beliefs). The effect of perceived closeness on attribute
change was borne out in the 2(perceived closeness: low vs. high) x 2(influence: attribute-
self-consistency vs. attribute-change) x 2(attribute type: representative vs.
unrepresentative) repeated-measures ANOYA. I predicted that participants who
experienced high perceived closeness would have higher "attribute-self-change" betas and
lower "attribute-consistency" betas, relative to participants who experienced less perceived
closeness with the target person. The hypothesized perceived closeness x influence
interaction for the personality attributes was significant, Wilk' s A = .95, F(1,96) = 4.60, P
< .05,112 = .046. As Figure 5 indicates, participants in the high perceived closeness
group were less consistent in attribute ratings for themselves than participants who
experienced perceived closeness. Conversely, participants' self-attribute responses in the
high perceived closeness group became more influenced by their ratings of the target
person's attributes, relative to the control condition. The three-way interaction of
perceived closeness x influence x representativeness was not significant, Wilk' s A = 1.0,
F(1,103) = .025,p = .88, 112 = .00.
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Figure 5. Perceived closeness x influence interaction for attribute ratings.
The final set of analyses examined the possible relationship between the attribute
overlap factor and attribute-change. The attribute overlap factor score was not associated
with either overall attribute-consistency (r = .045,p = .64, n = 108) or overall attribute-
change (r = .046, p = .64, n = 108). Attribute overlap was correlated with attribute-change
of unrepresentative traits (r = .19, p < .06, n = 106) but not representative traits (r = .082, p
= 040, n = 107) or). Examination of the individual adjective overlap items indicated that only
overlap of neutral traits was associated with increased overall attribute-consistency (r = .27,
p < .05, n = 102). None of the other correlations were significant (r' s from -.14 to .19).
Other Predictors ofSelf-Concept Change
Since the previous analyses indicated that perspective taking had no effect on self-
concept change, it was not necessary to test the hypothesis that self-other overlap
mediated this effect (i.e., Hypothesis 3). However, the findings did justify testing the
second part of this hypothesis (Hypothesis 3b), which was whether or not self-other
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overlap uniquely predicted self-concept change even when controlling for other possible
predictors of self-concept change. As results indicated that only perceived closeness was
associated with changes in self-concept, r specifically tested whether or not this effect
remained when other outcomes of perspective taking (such as empathic concern and
positive attitudes) were also included as predictors on self-concept change and/or self-
concept consistency by using path analysis modeling. Scores ofperceived closeness,
attribute overlap, empathic concern, and positive attitude were simultaneously estimated
in the model as predictors of both self-concept consistency and self-concept change
scores. As r was primarily interested in the unique effect of perceived closeness on self-
concept change, perceived closeness was allowed to co-vary with all of the other
predictors in the model. The two betas of self-concept consistency and self-concept
change were used as the outcome variables and were allowed to correlate in the model.
The first model examined the specific effect of these predictors on belief-change and
belief-consistency, while another model examined their effect on overall attribute-change
and attribute-consistency.
For belief change, this model fit the data well, X2 (2, n = 118) = 3.42, p = .18, CFr
= .97, RMSEA = .078 (90% cr .00-.21), SRMR = .028. As Figure 6 shows, perceived
closeness was correlated both with empathic concern and positive attitude, but only
perceived closeness significantly predicted the belief-change score. Neither empathic
concern (f:) = .005, z-score = .23) nor positive attitude (f:) = .002, z-score = .32) were
associated with changes in belief change. None of the predictors had any effect on the
belief-consistency betas.
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Figure 6. Path model predicting belief-change and belief-consistency.
For changes in self-description on all 16 attributes, the model also fit the data
well, X2 (2, n = 118) = 3.23,p = .20, CFI = 98, RMSEA = .072 (90% CI .00-.21), SRMR
= .028. Interestingly, perceived closeness no longer significantly predicted the attribute-
change score after including the other predictors of empathic concern, positive attitude,
and attribute overlap (see Figure 7). In particular, this decrease in the effect ofperceived
closeness may have been due to the presence of empathic concern. Empathic concern
was significantly correlated with perceived closeness, and unlike Modell, also had a
much stronger association with belief-change (~ = -.036. z-score = -1.90). Neither
positive attitude nor attribute overlap were associated with attitude-change, although
surprisingly, attribute overlap did positively predict attribute-consistency.
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Figure 7. Path model predicting attribute-change and attribute-consistency.
Discussion
In general, the results from this study provided support that perceived closeness
(which Study 2 demonstrated is influenced by perspective taking) leads to changes in a
people's self-concepts so that they become more similar to their perception of the other
person. Based on past research, Hypothesis 1 predicted that perspective taking would be
associated with increased self-other overlap. This hypothesis was only partially
supported in Study 3. The effect of perspective taking on self-other overlap was only
significant when using self-repOlted degree of perspective taking; there was no
significant of the manipulated perspective-taking condition variable. On the other hand,
Study 3 did find support for the hypothesis that self-other overlap is associated with self-
concept change at time 2. Specifically, participants who perceived greater self-other
overlap with the target person subsequently showed more influence by their perceptions
of that person when describing themselves. This effect occurred for both beliefs and
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attributes and it remained even when accounting for the effect of consistency in
describing the self across time. Both of these points are important, as past research had
not addressed them directly. Thus, Study 3 is unique from past research in that it
demonstrates that the relationship between self-other overlap and perceptions of the self
becoming more "other-like" varies depending both on the type of self-other overlap and
type of self-concept assessed.
First, consistent with Studies 1 and 2, this study again found evidence suggesting
that two general facets of self-other overlap exist. One type of overlap is more conscious
and assesses participant's perceptions and feeling of closeness (perceived closeness),
while a more subtle form of self-other overlap exists that taps participant's shared traits
and attributes with the other person (attribute overlap).
Second, these different facets of self-other overlap associated with distinct
psychological outcomes. Specifically, Study 3 suggests that perceived closeness predicts
whether aspects of the other person are incorporated into the self-concept. Results from
this study found that perceived closeness was consistently associated with both attribute-
and belief-change. This finding is consistent with other data suggesting that this facet of
self-other overlap is associated with self-concept change (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007).
On the other hand, attribute overlap does not appear to drive changes in one's beliefs or
attributes to match those of the other person. I found no evidence that attribute overlap
was associated with either form of self-concept change - neither changes in self-attributes
or beliefs. In fact, the only significant effects of attribute overlap that I found suggested
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that this type of type of self-other overlap was actually associated with greater self-
concept consistency.
In particular, it was somewhat surprising that attribute overlap did not at least
have an effect on changes in self-attributes, as they both focused on the same aspect of
the self-concept. Although there is considerable evidence from past studies indicating
that perspective taking leads to greater overlap in personality attributes for the self and
other, Study 3 suggests that this overlap occurs in only one direction. Several studies
have found that attribute overlap is driven by seeing the other as more "self-like"
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Davis et aI., 1996; Myers & Hodges, 2006), but this study
did not find evidence that attribute overlap is also driven by seeing the self as more
"other-like."
Study 3 also extended our understanding of these facets of self-other overlap by
demonstrating how they are conceptually different from other psychological phenomenon.
Hypothesis 3b examined whether the effect of self-other overlap on evoking self-concept
change was unique to that construct or a cause of some related construct. Research
suggests that self-other overlap is theoretically related to both empathic concern and positive
attitudes, so one concern was that it was these constructs (and not self-other overlap), that
led to self-concept change. However, the results from this study demonstrate that perceived
closeness is a distinct construct with its own set of psychological outcomes. Specifically,
perceived closeness - and not empathic concern or positive attitudes - significantly
predicted self-concept change of beliefs.
However, there is clearly some "overlap" between these constructs, as illustrated by
the set of findings examining the effect of perceived closeness on attribute-change. When
examined as the only predictor, perceived closeness was associated with attribute-change in
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the hypothesized direction. On the other hand, this effect disappeared in the path analysis
when empathic concern and positive attitudes were added. In particular, it appeared that
perceived closeness and empathic concern worked in conjunction to evoke changes in the
description of self-attributes. Thus, future studies that wish to examine the possible effect
of self-other overlap on self-concept change should also consider the dual role of self-other
overlap and empathic concern in evoking these changes.
Limits ofPerspective Taking on Evoking Self-Other Overlap and Self-Concept Change?
As mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, one hypothesis that was not
supported by the data was that perspective-taking manipulation would predict self-concept
change in the direction toward the target person. This was in contrast to the results of Study
2, where the perspective-taking manipulation increased perceived closeness. When
considering these results in conjunction with past research that have studied perspective
taking and self-other overlap, it is impOltant to note that the target person used in Study 3
was specifically designed to be substantially different from the typical participant. In fact, in
some ways this target person may have been the most different target person used in this
line of research to date. Thus, I believe that these non-significant results help illustrate a
potential limit on perspective taking's ability to evoke self-other overlap. If there is not
much overlap between the self and other to begin with, perspective taking may be ineffective
in enhancing perceptions of overlap with that person.
To explore this idea further, consider the results from Study 2 and the Davis et al.
(1996) study. Both studies used the video stimulus target "Lisa ", who - as stated in Davis
et al. (1996) - was specifically designed to be as "typical" a college student as possible.
These studies suggest that, in situations where we take the perspective of a person who is
similar to us, it can lead to enhanced feelings of closeness and greater attribute overlap.
Similarly, Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) used target people with similar demographic
characteristics as the participant (i.e., the targets were the same gender and also were
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undergraduates) to demonstrate that perspective taking and perceived closeness lead to the
incorporation of traits relevant to the target person into the participant's self-concept. In fact,
the examples that Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) provide in their article to describe when the
self-concept is likely to include aspects of the other person explicitly make reference to the
fact that this other person is already someone "close" to them (such as a "close
colleague" or "merged other"). Furthermore, they admit that self-concept change may be
less likely to occur when the attributes of the other person are counter to the self-image.
Although Galinsky et aI. (2005; 2008) used target stimuli that seemed to be
dissimilar from the perceiver, the extent of this difference may be less than it initially
appears because participants had to construct an image of the other person: Specifically, the
paradigm used in these studies gave participants a photograph of a person who was a
member of a stereotyped group, and asked participants to imagine a day in the life of a
person who was a member of that group. While participants likely ascribed stereotypical
attributes to the target person, they were also free to assume that the target person was
similar to themselves on other key aspects of their self-concept. For example, when
participants were instructed to take the perspective of a photo of an elderly person in
Galinsky et al. (2008), they could have imagined how they themselves would be at that age
when they were trying to imagine the person in the photograph. In contrast, the target
person in the current Study 3 did not allow for the same level of construction by the
participants. Much more information was provided about the target person regarding how
his personality attributes and beliefs might differ from participants' self-concept.
Consequently, there was greater potential for participants in Study 3 to view the target
person as too dissimilar, thus reducing the chances that perspective taking would reliably
increase self-other overlap.
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From a social-function standpoint, it might be beneficial to have such a safe-guard
on perspective taking. In everyday life, we wouldn't want to "expand" the self to include
everyone we interacted with - especially those who have very different point of views than
ours. For example, it would not be beneficial if our beliefs were easily swayed whenever we
listened to a KKK member discuss his or her views on white supremacy. If initial perceived
closeness with the other person is too low, this may serve as an implicit sign for the
perceiver that he or she should not become more like the other person. Future research
could explicitly test whether an initial level of perceived closeness with the other person is
necessary for self-concept to occur, and if so, how much initial overlap is required.
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Returning to the introduction, the stated purpose of this dissertation was to answer
three related research questions: 1) Is "self-other overlap" a uni-dimensional or multi-
faceted construct? 2) Does perspective taking affect different types of self-other overlap?
3) Does perspective affect the direction of self-other overlap? Now that the three studies
have been conducted and described in this dissertation, we can now examine how, and to
what extent, these questions have been answered by the research:
Is "Self-Other Overlap" a Multi-Dimensional Construct?
Across all three studies, results consistently indicated that the various measures of
self-other overlap being used did not tap the same uni-dimensional construct. Rather, the
clear message of this dissertation is that self-other overlap is a multi-dimensional
construct. Furthermore, these measures of self-other overlap generally fell into two
different factors that I have called perceived closeness and attribute overlap. This
consistent finding is particular striking when one considers that all three studies involved
different targets (best friend, acquaintance, college student, researcher), different
methodologies (comparison of close versus non-close others, perspective-taking
manipulation, repeated-measures design), and different measures of self-other overlap.
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Of course, slight variations in the factor structure were found among the three studies, for
several reasons described below.
Of the two facets of self-other overlap, perceived closeness appears to be the most
robust factor. This factor was always the first factor that was extracted from the factor
analysis, and consequently, explained most of the variance. The items that consistently
loaded on this factor were the lOS, dynamic lOS, "we"-ness, and perceived similarity.
One common element among these measures is that they are fairly direct perceptions of
merging and closeness. All of these measures required the participant to focus on the self
in relation with another person. For example, Cialdini and colleagues, who had used the
"we"-ness measure and perceived similarity previously, described the construct they were
measuring as "oneness" and "merged identities." The factor ofperceived closeness also
appears similar to what Aron et al.' s (1992) called feeling close. Aron et al. (1992)
hypothesized that the lOS and feeling close tapped a kind of subjective closeness that
contributed to a sense of being interconnected with another. Again, this idea of
interconnectedness and perceptions of merging seem to be important elements underlying
this factor.
Aron et al.' s (1992) decision to use the phrase "feeling" close also suggests an
affective component to this factor. This may explain why perceived closeness was
significantly correlated with felt care and liking for the target person in Study 1. In sum,
perceived closeness appears to assess a direct type of self-other overlap that focuses
participant's attention on perceptions of the self in a relationship with the other person.
In fact, some have suggested that this type of overlap also taps the concept of the "social
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self' (De Cremer, 2004). It also appears to contain an affective component: When
people feel close to someone, they also perceive themselves to overlap with that person.
In contrast, attribute overlap tapped a more implicit facet of self-other overlap
that focused on overlapping mental representations of the self and the other person.
Unlike perceived closeness, the measures that loaded on this factor did not make ask
about the participant's relationship with the other person. In fact, they were created and
administered in such a way that participants would likely be unaware that they were
measuring any form of "overlap" with the other person. This form of self-other overlap
is probably less conscious than perceived closeness. Consistent with this idea, Davis et al.
(1996) found that their adjective overlap measures (which frequently loaded on this
factor) were not affected by additional cognitive load, suggesting that perception of
overlapping representations is not a process under conscious control or something that
participants have direct awareness of (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Future research should
explore this hypothesis further.
Unlike perceived closeness, the attribute overlap factor exhibited more variability
in its structure across the three studies. Interestingly, one consistent finding was that
attribute overlap of negative and neutral traits was uncorrelated with perceived closeness.
This was true although all of the analyses used across the three studies allowed for these
factors to be correlated. Fluctuations in attribute overlap appeared to be primarily
associated with adj ective overlap of positive traits. For example, in Study 1, overlap of
positive traits loaded with overlap of negative and neutral traits on a second factor that
was uncorrelated with perceived closeness. However, in Study 2, overlap of positive
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traits loaded with the absolute difference of attributes on a third factor that was
moderately correlated with perceived closeness. Finally, in Study 3, overlap of positive
traits again loaded on a factor with overlap of negative and neutral traits, but exploratory
factor analysis suggested that it also was moderately with perceived similarity.
Furthermore, overlap of adjective traits (and not overlap of negative and neutral traits)
was affected by the perspective-taking manipulations in Study 2 and 3, suggesting that
the distinction between perceiving overlap with another person on positive traits versus
perceiving overlap with him or her on negative and neutral traits may be psychologically
important. Galinsky et al. (2005; 2008) have suggested that the purpose of self-other
overlap and perspective taking is to help foster social bonds. As such, the norm might be
to overlap with others on just positive traits (i.e., a form of "benevolent overlap"), and
only in extreme instances would the person perceive greater overlap of negative traits
with the other person.
What could account for the different factor structure of attribute overlap in Study
1 versus Study 2? One strong possibility is that the target person had an effect on the
structure of attribute overlap. In Study 1, participants completed these measures of self-
other overlap for their best friend, while in Study 2, the target person was a stranger.
Perhaps a sign of truly being "best friends" is an increased tendency to share both
positive and negative traits with the other person. Consistent with this view, Aron et al.
(1991) found no effect of valence on participants' speed in making me/not me responses
to traits that they shared with their significant other (or romantic partner). Participants
were equally slow at identifying whether traits were self-descriptive when those traits
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were ones that they did not share with their partner, regardless of whether they were
positive or negative traits. One implication of this finding is that self-other overlap at the
beginning of a relationship should resemble the three-factor structure found for the
acquaintance and stranger from Study 2, but after a relationship has sufficiently
developed, the distinction between overlap of positive versus negative attributes
dissolves.
Does Perspective Taking Affect Different Types of Self-Other Overlap?
Examining the psychometric properties of self-other overlap measures is an
important research task on its own, but having once established that self-other overlap
was multi-dimensional, I was able to turn to the central question of whether or not the
association between perspective taking and self-other overlap differed among these
factors. Again, the clear message of this dissertation is that perspective taking affects
some but not all aspects of self-other overlap. In particular, both Studies 1 and 2 found
evidence that perceived closeness and adjective overlap of positive traits are sensitive to
changes to the perspective we take when forming impressions of another person. In
contrast, taking the perspective of another person does not foster increased perceptions of
overlapping on negative or neutral traits with that person (in fact, one surprising finding
from Study 3 is that perspective taking may actually lead to less overlap of negative
traits.
These studies also provide some insights into possible limitations of perspective
taking in enhancing self-other overlap. In Study 3, only participants' self-reported
attempts at perspective taking was associated with perceived closeness and adjective
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overlap of positive traits; the experimental manipulation of perspective taking had no
effect. However, other theoretical outcomes of perspective taking (such as greater
empathic concern and more positive attitudes) were found to be associated with Study 3's
perspective taking manipulation, which suggests that the manipulation was effective.
Instead, the target person in Study 3 may simply have been too different from most of the
participants for the perspective-taking manipulation to lead to any form of self-other
overlap. Perhaps some threshold of similarity with the other person must be met initially
before perspective taking can have any effect on increased self-other overlap - future
studies could test this hypothesis.
In a related vein, Neuberg et al. (1997) have suggested that feelings of empathic
concern may serve as the initial starter to kick-off perceptions of self-other overlap.
Once feelings of empathic concern dissipate, other predictors of self-other overlap (such
as perspective taking) can then begin to have an effect on enhancing self-other overlap.
While the target person in Study 3 did evoke greater empathic concern for participants in
the perspective-taking condition, the target person was clearly not describing a distressing
life experience, and consequently, did not evoke much empathic concern. Thus, the
relationship between perspective-taking and self-other overlap may be contingent not
only on the type of self-other overlap measured, but also on aspects of the target (i.e.,
degree of similarity/dissimilarity with the perceiver) and aspects of the target's situation
(i.e., to what extent his or plight evokes empathic concern). These considerations relate
directly to the last question addressed by this dissertation.
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Does Perspective Taking Affect the Direction of Self-Other Overlap?
Because the perspective-taking manipulation failed to evoke greater self-other
overlap with the target person, Study 3 was unable to examine the direction in which this
overlap occurred. As mentioned above, if perspective taking does lead to the self become
more "other-like," then it may only occur in certain contexts. For example, evidence of
self-expansion in the close relationship literature would suggest that perspective taking is
more likely to lead to self-concept change when we know the person well and are close to
them already. Drawing from work on persuasion, research has indicated that people will
change their attitudes to be more similar to the themes of a story if the story is more
engaging and transportive (Green & Brock; 2000). Similarly, a target person who is
more engaging may make it easier for perceivers to expand the self towards that person
when they are taking his or her perspective, even if that target person is a non-close other.
While a chain of events linking perspective taking to self-expansion has not been
clearly established, Study 3 of this dissertation did provide compelling evidence that self-
other overlap predicts self-expansion. In particular, perceived closeness appears to
connect self-other overlap with self-expansion. Attribute overlap had no consistent effect
in predicting self-concept change. Additionally, the association between self-other
overlap and change in the self-concept toward the other person is something that is
unique to self-other overlap. There was no evidence that feelings of empathic concern or
positive attitudes toward the target person also led to corresponding changes in the
paliicipant's self-concept. Thus, the evidence suggests that self-other overlap (and
96
perceived closeness, in particular) may be an important construct in understanding how
people come to change over time, and why people are influenced by those around them.
Conclusions
While the concept of "self-other overlap" has the potential to explain the link
between perspective taking and various pro-social outcomes (such as altruistic helping
and decreased stereotyping), the studies in this dissertation make it clear that it is
important to specify what aspect of self-other overlap is being discussed. This seems
especially true when examining past research in the area of perspective taking, where
ambiguity about what self-other overlap means may have slowed progress thus far.
Compelling evidence in this dissertation suggests that self-other overlap has multiple
facets, each of which is tied to distinct psychological and social implications.
Specifically, only certain facets of self-other overlap are related to perspective-taking;
others are related to the idea of "self-expansion." Ideally, additional research will
continue to explicate specific connections between self-other overlap, perspective taking,
and self-expansion, as well as addressing related questions about conflict resolution and
self-perception. At the very least, I hope these findings alert researchers that they need to
consider what type of self-other overlap will be affected in their studies, and to tailor their
hypotheses and methods for measuring this construct accordingly.
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APPENDIX
BELIEF STATEMENTS FROM STUDY 3
Being a researcher is a time-consuming job
Learning something new is a reward that keeps me motivated to work
I enjoy being in a leadership position
I would prefer ajob where I know exactly what I have to do each day
The primary thing that I would consider when choosing a job is how well it pays
If I had a choice, I would rather work on my own than be part of a group project
Everyone is biased in some way, even if they are not to supposed to be in that situation
I enjoy those types of days when I'm moving from on new activity to another
When I'm working on something important, it's OK with me if I don't have a clear sign of
the progress I've made that day
Patience is an important characteristic to have
Balancing a career with family life is worth the potential sacrifices I would have to give up to
make it work
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